EU NIS2 Directive (2022) — reference-depth plugin backed by the SCF crosswalk (68 SCF → 30 framework controls).
- version
- 0.1.0
- GitHub stars
- 436
Install
/plugin install eu-nis2@grc-engineering-suiteRun it inside Claude Code after adding the marketplace with /plugin marketplace add GRCEngClub/claude-grc-engineering.
Contents
Discovered from sourceSkills 1
EU NIS2 Directive Expert
Reference-depth expertise for the EU NIS2 Directive — Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. NIS2 repealed the original NIS Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/1148) and entered into force on 16 January 2023, with a transposition deadline of 17 October 2024.
This plugin bundles the SCF crosswalk (68 SCF controls → 30 NIS2 directive-level controls) with directive-specific scoping, governance, evidence, and incident-reporting context. Detailed technical and organisational measures from Article 21 are elaborated in the NIS2 implementing acts (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 for digital infrastructure / DNS / TLD / cloud / data centre / CDN / managed service / managed security / online marketplace / search engine / social networking entities — known here as "the Annex"); a parallel SCF mapping emea-eu-nis2-annex-2024 covers the 351-control breakdown of those technical measures.
Framework identity
- Instrument: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2). A Directive, not a Regulation — Member States transpose it into national law.
- Predecessor: NIS1 (Directive (EU) 2016/1148), repealed by Article 44 of NIS2.
- Entry into force: 16 January 2023.
- Transposition deadline: 17 October 2024. As of late 2025–early 2026, transposition status varies sharply by Member State; some states (Germany's NIS2UmsuCG, Belgium's NIS2 law, Italy's Decreto Legislativo n. 138/2024) had national laws in force on or near time, several others were delayed and ran (or are still running) Commission infringement procedures.
- SCF framework ID:
emea-eu-nis2-2022(directive). Companion:emea-eu-nis2-annex-2024(Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 technical measures). - Region: EMEA (EU + EEA where applicable through joint committee decisions).
- Direct enforcement: No. NIS2 is enforced by each Member State's national competent authority via that state's transposition law. ENISA coordinates EU-wide and runs the CSIRTs Network and EU-CyCLONe.
- Affected sectors: 18 categories grouped into Annex I (essential) and Annex II (important) — see "Sectoral scope" below.
- Penalty exposure: Administrative fines whose national maximums must be at least €10 million or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover (essential entities) and at least €7 million or 1.4% of total worldwide annual turnover (important entities), whichever is higher, per Article 34. Member States may set higher national maximums.
Framework in plain language
NIS2 is the EU's baseline cybersecurity law for organisations that run critical or important services. It does four things at once:
- Expands NIS1's scope from a small list of "operators of essential services" and "digital service providers" to roughly 18 sectors covering most medium and large organisations in critical supply chains (energy, transport, healthcare, drinking water, wastewater, banking, financial market infrastructure, digital infrastructure, ICT service management, postal services, manufacturing of medical devices and machinery, digital providers, food, chemicals, waste, public administration, research, space).
- Imposes a harmonised baseline of cybersecurity risk-management measures on in-scope entities (the ten Article 21 domains).
- Imposes a harmonised incident-reporting regime with a 24-hour early warning, a 72-hour incident notification, and a 1-month final report (Article 23).
- Introduces management-body accountability (Article 20): the management body of an in-scope entity must approve cybersecurity risk-management measures, oversee their implementation, and undergo regular cybersecurity training. National laws may attach personal liability to management-body members for serious failures.
NIS2 is jurisdictionally uneven. Because it is a Directive, the substantive rules a regulator can enforce against you are in your Member State's transposition law, not in NIS2 itself. The directive defines a floor; many Member States layer additional national requirements on top (mandatory CISO appointments, registration deadlines, sectoral rules, sector-specific reporting portals). This plugin focuses on the directive-level baseline that all Member State laws must implement; national specifics are downstream.
Sectoral scope and entity classification
NIS2 applies a size-based threshold combined with a sector list, with carve-outs that pull smaller organisations in.
Step 1: Sector check (Annex I or Annex II?)
Annex I — high-criticality sectors (default classification: essential):
- Energy — electricity, district heating and cooling, oil, gas, hydrogen
- Transport — air, rail, water, road
- Banking — credit institutions
- Financial market infrastructures — trading venues, central counterparties
- Health — healthcare providers, EU reference laboratories, R&D entities for medicinal products, manufacturers of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations, manufacturers of critical medical devices
- Drinking water — suppliers and distributors of water intended for human consumption
- Wastewater — wastewater collection, disposal, treatment undertakings
- Digital infrastructure — IXPs, DNS service providers (excluding root servers), TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, trust service providers, providers of public electronic communications networks, providers of publicly available electronic communications services
- ICT service management (B2B) — managed service providers, managed security service providers
- Public administration — central government, certain regional government entities (Member States choose how far down the public sector this reaches)
- Space — operators of ground-based infrastructure that supports the provision of space-based services
Annex II — other critical sectors (default classification: important):
- Postal and courier services
- Waste management
- Manufacture, production and distribution of chemicals
- Production, processing and distribution of food
- Manufacturing — medical devices and in-vitro diagnostic medical devices; computer, electronic and optical products; electrical equipment; machinery and equipment; motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers; other transport equipment
- Digital providers — providers of online marketplaces, online search engines, social networking services platforms
- Research — research organisations (excluding educational institutions, unless Member States choose to include them)
Step 2: Size check
Apply the medium-sized enterprise threshold from Recommendation 2003/361/EC at the entity level:
- Medium-sized = 50 or more employees OR annual turnover and balance sheet total each above €10 million.
- Below the medium threshold = micro/small = generally out of scope under the size threshold alone.
Entities that meet or exceed the medium threshold in an Annex I sector are essential; in an Annex II sector are important. This is the default classification before carve-outs.
Step 3: Carve-outs and overrides (size-independent)
The size threshold is overridden in either direction by Article 2 and Article 3:
- Always in scope regardless of size — qualified and non-qualified trust service providers; TLD name registries and DNS service providers; providers of public electronic communications networks and publicly available electronic communications services; sole providers in a Member State of a service essential for societal or economic activities; entities providing services on which the Member State's economy or constitutional order depends; entities qualified as critical entities under the Critical Entities Resilience Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2557, "CER"); public administration entities of central government as designated by the Member State.
- Member-State discretion to widen scope — Member States may classify additional entities as essential or important based on the role they play in their economy.
- Member-State discretion to narrow scope — limited carve-outs for entities providing services exclusively to defence or national security.
Step 4: Essential vs important — what changes?
The classification matters because supervisory regime and fines differ:
| Aspect | Essential entities | Important entities |
|---|---|---|
| Supervision | Ex-ante (proactive) — regular and targeted security audits, on-site inspections, requests for evidence by the competent authority on its own initiative | Ex-post (reactive) — supervision triggered by evidence of non-compliance, incidents, or complaints |
| Maximum administrative fine | At least €10 million or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover (whichever is higher) | At least €7 million or 1.4% of total worldwide annual turnover (whichever is higher) |
| Management-body accountability | Article 20 applies fully; management-body members can be temporarily prohibited from exercising managerial functions for serious non-compliance | Article 20 applies fully but the temporary management-prohibition power does not apply to the same extent |
| Registration | Required with the national competent authority; some sectors (DNS, TLD, cloud, data centre, CDN, managed service, managed security, marketplace, search engine, social networking) register additionally with ENISA via Article 27 | Required with the national competent authority |
In practice, most enterprise GRC questions about NIS2 collapse into: "are we Annex I or Annex II?" and "do we exceed the medium threshold?" Get those two right and the rest of the obligations follow.
Article 20 — Management-body accountability
Article 20 shifts cybersecurity from "the security team's problem" to "the board's problem":
- The management body of an in-scope entity must approve the cybersecurity risk-management measures taken under Article 21.
- The management body must oversee the implementation of those measures.
- Members of the management body must follow training sufficient to identify risks and assess cybersecurity risk-management practices, and must offer similar training to employees on a regular basis.
- Member States must provide that management-body members can be held liable for breaches of these duties under conditions defined by national law.
- Competent authorities may, for essential entities, temporarily prohibit any natural person discharging managerial responsibilities at CEO or legal-representative level from exercising those responsibilities until non-compliance is remedied (Article 32(5)).
In practice this means the plugin should help the user produce board-level evidence: minutes showing approval of cybersecurity policies and the risk-treatment plan, training completion records for the management body, and a clear paper trail showing the board oversees the implementation programme (not just rubber-stamps it).
Article 21 — The ten cybersecurity risk-management measures
Article 21(1) requires in-scope entities to take "appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures" to manage the risks posed to the security of network and information systems used for their operations, and to prevent or minimise the impact of incidents. Article 21(2) lists ten domains the measures must cover at a minimum. The plugin organises evidence and assessment by these ten domains:
- (a) Policies on risk analysis and information system security — formally approved policies for risk analysis, asset management, change management, vulnerability management, secure development, secure operations, and the overall ISMS or equivalent.
- (b) Incident handling — detection, response, recovery, post-incident analysis, and the procedures that feed Article 23 reporting.
- (c) Business continuity — backup management and disaster recovery, crisis management, and tested recovery plans for the services covered by NIS2.
- (d) Supply chain security — security of relationships with direct suppliers and service providers, including the cybersecurity practices of suppliers and the impact of vulnerabilities in their products and services. The Cooperation Group's coordinated supply-chain risk assessments (Article 22) feed this domain.
- (e) Security in network and information systems acquisition, development and maintenance — including vulnerability handling and disclosure.
- (f) Policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk-management measures — assurance, internal audit, control testing, KPIs, and management review.
- (g) Basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training — for all staff, including the management body (cross-references Article 20).
- (h) Policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography — including, where appropriate, encryption.
- (i) Human resources security, access control policies and asset management — joiners/movers/leavers, identity lifecycle, least privilege, asset inventory.
- (j) Multi-factor or continuous authentication, secured voice/video/text communications, and secured emergency communication systems within the entity.
Article 21(3) tells competent authorities to take into account the entity's exposure, size, likelihood of incidents, and the costs of measures when assessing proportionality. Article 21(5) authorises the Commission to adopt implementing acts setting more detailed requirements for specific sectors — the most consequential of these to date is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, which fleshes out the technical and methodological requirements for digital infrastructure, ICT service management, and digital providers (cloud, data centre, CDN, DNS, TLD, managed service, managed security, online marketplace, search engine, social networking). For organisations in those sectors, the Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 control catalogue is the operative compliance text.
Article 23 — Incident reporting timeline
Article 23 sets a three-stage reporting timeline for any "significant incident" affecting an in-scope entity. A significant incident is one that:
- has caused or is capable of causing severe operational disruption of the services or financial loss for the entity, OR
- has affected or is capable of affecting other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage.
The three deadlines run from the moment the entity becomes aware of the incident:
| Stage | Deadline | Required content |
|---|---|---|
| Early warning | Within 24 hours | Whether the incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts; whether it could have a cross-border impact. Brief — designed to alert the CSIRT/competent authority quickly. |
| Incident notification | Within 72 hours | Update on the early warning; initial assessment of the incident including its severity and impact; where available, indicators of compromise. |
| Final report | Within 1 month of the incident notification | Detailed description of the incident (severity and impact); the type of threat or root cause that likely triggered the incident; the mitigation measures applied and ongoing; where applicable, the cross-border impact. If the incident is ongoing at the 1-month mark, an interim report is due at 1 month, with the final report due 1 month after the incident is handled. |
Additional reporting touchpoints from Article 23:
- The CSIRT or competent authority must respond to the early warning within 24 hours, including initial feedback and, on request, guidance on possible mitigation measures.
- Where appropriate, in particular where the incident concerns two or more Member States, the competent authority/CSIRT informs the other affected Member States and ENISA.
- Recipients of the entity's services may need to be notified directly if the incident may adversely affect the provision of the service (Article 23(2)).
- For significant cyber threats, in-scope entities should also notify recipients of services that may be affected of the threat and any measures or remedies available (Article 23(2) second subparagraph).
The 24h/72h/1mo cadence is the single most operationally consequential part of NIS2. Every IR runbook in scope must be re-timed against it. National competent authorities have published reporting portals and templates — the plugin's breach-reporting runbook (a Full-depth candidate) should pre-populate the structured fields each portal requires.
Article 24 — European cybersecurity certification schemes
Article 24 lets the Commission, by implementing act, require categories of essential and important entities to use certified ICT products, services, and processes — under EU cybersecurity certification schemes adopted under the EU Cybersecurity Act (Regulation (EU) 2019/881). As of early 2026 the candidate scheme most often discussed in this context is EUCS (EU Cloud Services scheme, in development at ENISA). When adopted and an Article 24 implementing act references it, in-scope cloud customers may need to procure only EUCS-certified services at the relevant assurance level. The plugin should flag this as a forward-looking obligation rather than an immediate one.
Articles 32–34 — Supervision and enforcement
- Article 32 — Supervisory and enforcement measures for essential entities: ex-ante supervision. Competent authorities can carry out on-site inspections, off-site supervision, regular and targeted security audits at the entity's expense, ad-hoc audits, security scans based on objective non-discriminatory risk assessment criteria, requests for information and evidence demonstrating implementation of cybersecurity policies, requests for the results of security audits, and orders to comply.
- Article 33 — Supervisory and enforcement measures for important entities: ex-post supervision. The same toolkit applies but is triggered by evidence of non-compliance, incidents, or complaints — not by routine inspection.
- Article 34 — General conditions for imposing administrative fines: fines are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The directive sets the floors for the maximum fines: €10 million or 2% of worldwide annual turnover for essential entities, €7 million or 1.4% of worldwide annual turnover for important entities, whichever is higher in each case. Member States may set higher caps in national law and must define the criteria for setting the actual fine in a concrete case (gravity, intentional or negligent character, prior infringements, financial benefit gained, cooperation with the authority, etc.).
Beyond fines, Article 32(4) and (5) give competent authorities a strong corrective toolkit for essential entities: orders to bring conduct into compliance, orders to inform affected service recipients about the threat, orders to implement specific measures within a deadline, designation of a monitoring officer, orders to make a public statement, and (uniquely to NIS2) the temporary prohibition on management-body members exercising managerial responsibilities.
Mandatory artifacts
The directive does not name a single canonical artifact in the way GDPR names ROPAs, PCI DSS names ROCs, or FedRAMP names SSPs. But a NIS2-compliant programme typically maintains:
- Risk-management policy and risk register covering the ten Article 21 domains (Article 21(2)(a), (f)).
- Asset inventory (hardware, software, data, third-party services) feeding the risk register (Article 21(2)(i)).
- Incident-handling procedure / IR runbook explicitly aligned to the 24h/72h/1mo Article 23 timeline (Article 21(2)(b), Article 23).
- Business continuity plan and DR plan, with evidence of testing (Article 21(2)(c)).
- Supply-chain security register with supplier risk ratings, security clauses in contracts, and treatment of vulnerabilities in supplier products/services (Article 21(2)(d), Article 22).
- SDLC / change-management / vulnerability-management procedures and records (Article 21(2)(e)).
- Effectiveness-assessment evidence — internal audit reports, management reviews, KPIs, control test results (Article 21(2)(f)).
- Cyber-hygiene baseline and training records, including completion records for the management body (Article 20, Article 21(2)(g)).
- Cryptographic policy and inventory of where cryptography is applied (Article 21(2)(h)).
- Access-control policy and identity lifecycle records — joiner/mover/leaver tickets, periodic access reviews, MFA enforcement evidence (Article 21(2)(i), (j)).
- Board-approval evidence — minutes of the meeting at which the management body approved the Article 21 measures, and minutes showing periodic oversight (Article 20).
- Registration record with the national competent authority (and with ENISA for the digital-infrastructure / ICT-service-management / digital-provider categories under Article 27).
- Incident register — every reported incident with the chronology and copies of the early-warning, notification, and final-report submissions.
National transposition laws can name and specify additional artifacts (e.g., Germany's NIS2UmsuCG references specific evidence formats for KRITIS operators carried over from the IT-Sicherheitsgesetz lineage). Confirm against your Member State's law.
Cadence and timelines
- Incident reporting: 24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification, 1-month final report (Article 23).
- Management-body training: regular — Article 20 does not specify a frequency but national laws and competent-authority guidance commonly land on annual training plus refresher when material changes occur.
- Risk-management measure review: not specified in the directive but typically aligned to the entity's ISMS cycle (annual review, plus event-driven re-assessment after significant change). Article 21(3) requires the measures to evolve with the threat landscape.
- Cooperation Group coordinated supply-chain risk assessments: ad hoc, when the Cooperation Group decides under Article 22.
- Member-State reporting to the Commission: Member States report aggregated incident statistics to the Commission and ENISA every six months (Article 23(9)) and a summary report on NIS2 implementation every two years (Article 40).
- Registration with national competent authority: deadlines are set by the national transposition law. Many Member States set short deadlines (3-6 months) after the transposition law takes effect; check yours.
- Commission review of NIS2 itself: by 17 October 2027 and every 36 months thereafter, the Commission reviews the functioning of NIS2 (Article 40).
Regulator and enforcement
- National competent authorities designated by each Member State carry out supervision and enforcement. Examples: ANSSI (France), BSI (Germany — supervision currently shared with sectoral regulators), CCB (Belgium), NCSC-NL (Netherlands), AGID/ACN (Italy), INCIBE (Spain), HSCC (Ireland and other variants).
- National CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) handle incident notifications and provide initial response support.
- ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) coordinates EU-wide, runs the CSIRTs Network and EU-CyCLONe (large-scale crisis cooperation), and maintains the registry of certain digital-infrastructure entities.
- Cooperation Group under Article 14 brings together Member State representatives, the Commission, and ENISA to coordinate and produce guidance.
- Enforcement patterns (early years post-transposition, 2024–2026): regulators have prioritised entity registration, baseline supervision questionnaires, and follow-up on reported incidents. Several Member States have published audit checklists aligned to the ten Article 21 domains. Significant fines have not yet dominated the early enforcement story — orders to comply, requests for evidence, and management-body training audits have. Expect this to shift as transposition matures.
Interaction with other frameworks
- GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) — overlapping incident reporting. A single security incident can simultaneously be a NIS2 "significant incident" (Article 23, 24h/72h/1mo to the CSIRT) and a GDPR "personal data breach" (Article 33, 72h to the Data Protection Authority). The two notifications go to different authorities and have different content requirements. Run them in parallel; do not let one block the other. The plugin's incident workflow should remind users to evaluate both regimes for every event.
- DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Digital Operational Resilience Act) — lex specialis for financial entities. DORA is a Regulation (directly applicable, no transposition) covering ICT risk for banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, payment institutions, crypto-asset service providers, and other financial entities. For topics DORA covers (ICT risk management, incident reporting, threat-led penetration testing, third-party ICT risk including the critical-third-party oversight regime), DORA overrides NIS2 for in-scope financial entities (NIS2 Recital 28 and Article 4). NIS2 still applies to financial entities for topics DORA does not cover. The plugin should detect financial-sector entities and route them to a DORA workflow for the overlapping topics.
- CER (Directive (EU) 2022/2557, Critical Entities Resilience Directive) — sister directive to NIS2 covering physical resilience of critical entities in 11 sectors. Many entities are in scope of both. NIS2 Article 2(3) and CER explicitly coordinate: an entity identified as a "critical entity" under CER is automatically in scope of NIS2 as essential. The plugin should remind users that the two regimes apply jointly and that the national-law touchpoints often share governance structures and reporting portals.
- eIDAS (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 — eIDAS 2) — trust service providers are simultaneously eIDAS-regulated and in NIS2 scope, with eIDAS supervision coordinated with NIS2 competent authorities under Article 32(7).
- EU Cybersecurity Act (Regulation (EU) 2019/881) — feeds NIS2 via Article 24 (use of European cybersecurity certification schemes for essential and important entities).
- NIS1 (Directive (EU) 2016/1148) — fully repealed by NIS2 Article 44. Member-State NIS1 transposition laws have been or are being replaced by NIS2 transposition laws.
- National cybersecurity laws that pre-date NIS2 (e.g., Germany's IT-Sicherheitsgesetz / KRITIS regime, France's LPM-OIV regime) — generally amended or partially superseded by the NIS2 transposition law. Check the national instrument; many keep the operator-of-essential-services concept under a new label.
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and Annex A controls — a certified ISMS is widely treated as good prima facie evidence for the Article 21 domains, but is not a safe harbour. A NIS2 supervisor will still want to see how the ISMS scope, risk register, and controls map to NIS2's specific concerns (notably supply chain in 21(2)(d) and incident reporting in Article 23).
- NIST CSF 2.0 / NIST 800-53 — useful internal mappings; the SCF crosswalk this plugin uses provides automated cross-reference, so contributors should not maintain a hand-rolled mapping table.
Common misinterpretations
- "NIS2 is directly applicable like GDPR." It is not. NIS2 is a Directive; the substantive obligations a regulator can enforce against you live in your Member State's transposition law, not in NIS2 itself. Always read the national law alongside the directive.
- "NIS2 only applies if we're an essential service operator." That was NIS1's framing. NIS2 added the much-broader "important entity" tier and 18 sectors. Many organisations now in scope (manufacturers of medical devices, food producers, postal services, social networking platforms, research organisations) had no NIS1 obligations.
- "We're below 50 employees so we're out of scope." Often true under the size threshold alone, but the size-independent overrides (Article 2(2)) pull in trust service providers, DNS providers, TLD registries, providers of public electronic communications networks/services, sole providers, providers of services on which the Member State depends, and entities qualified as "critical entities" under CER — regardless of size.
- "We have 72 hours to report a breach, like GDPR." The Article 23 timeline is 24 hours for an early warning, then 72 hours for the notification, then 1 month for the final report. The 24-hour clock starts when the entity becomes aware of the incident, not when investigation is complete. Do not conflate with GDPR's 72-hour breach notification — they are separate regimes and may both apply to one event.
- "Cybersecurity is the security team's responsibility — Article 20 is about training." Article 20 makes the management body legally accountable for approving and overseeing the Article 21 measures, with personal-liability hooks in national law. Training is the floor; approval and oversight are the substance.
- "NIS2 requires an ISO 27001 certificate." It does not. Article 21 requires "appropriate and proportionate" measures across the ten domains. ISO 27001 is one widely used way to demonstrate them, but national supervisors will still want to see explicit mapping to NIS2's concerns (especially supply chain, incident reporting, and management-body oversight).
- "Financial entities have to do NIS2 and DORA in full." Not for the topics DORA covers. DORA is lex specialis and overrides NIS2 for in-scope financial entities on ICT risk management, incident reporting, TLPT, and ICT third-party risk (NIS2 Article 4). NIS2 still applies for topics DORA does not cover.
- "NIS2 has its own EU-level fine schedule like GDPR." Article 34 sets the floors for the maximum administrative fine each Member State must allow (€10M / 2% for essential, €7M / 1.4% for important). Actual fines and the criteria for setting them are set by national law. Some Member States have set higher caps and stricter aggravating factors.
Command routing
/eu-nis2:scope— determine essential vs important vs out-of-scope, walking through the sector → size → carve-out decision tree./eu-nis2:assess— run a gap assessment against the directive baseline via the SCF crosswalk./eu-nis2:evidence-checklist— enumerate evidence requirements organised by the ten Article 21 domains and the Article 23 reporting workflow.
All three commands delegate to /grc-engineer:gap-assessment with SCF framework ID emea-eu-nis2-2022 for the control-by-control mechanics, and wrap the results in NIS2-specific terminology (essential/important entity classification, Article 21 domain headings, Article 23 timing).
Levelling up to Full
Full-depth NIS2 plugins ship workflow commands tied to the NIS2 audit and reporting ritual. Strong candidates for level-up PRs:
/eu-nis2:incident-runbook— produce a 24h/72h/1mo runbook tailored to the user's national competent authority and CSIRT, with the structured fields each portal requires pre-populated./eu-nis2:board-pack— generate the board-approval pack required by Article 20 (cybersecurity policy, risk register, treatment plan, training plan, KPIs, decisions to be ratified)./eu-nis2:registration— walk through the registration workflow with the national competent authority and (for the digital-infrastructure / ICT-service-management / digital-provider categories) with ENISA under Article 27./eu-nis2:supply-chain-attestation— produce the supplier-side attestation pack used to satisfy Article 21(2)(d) when an in-scope entity is itself a supplier to another in-scope entity./eu-nis2:annex-mapping— for entities in scope of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, map the 10 Article 21 domains down to the 351-control technical breakdown via theemea-eu-nis2-annex-2024SCF crosswalk.
References
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on EUR-Lex — the directive text.
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 — technical and methodological requirements for digital infrastructure, ICT service management, and digital providers (the "Annex" controls).
- European Commission — NIS2 Directive — EU-level policy overview, scope, and implementation guidance.
- Cooperation Group publications — EU-level coordinated guidance and Article 22 supply-chain risk assessments.
- Secure Controls Framework — crosswalk source (CC BY-ND 4.0).
- SCF API entry for NIS2 directive and NIS2 Annex (Implementing Regulation 2024/2690).
- National transposition laws — check your Member State's official journal; the obligations a regulator can enforce against you live in the national instrument, not in the directive itself.
Commands 3
EU NIS2 Assessment
Runs a compliance gap assessment against the EU NIS2 Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2555) by delegating to /grc-engineer:gap-assessment with the framework's SCF identifier, then overlays directive-specific context: the entity classification (essential vs important), the ten Article 21 risk-management domains, and the Article 23 reporting readiness.
NIS2 is a Directive — the rules a regulator enforces against an in-scope entity live in the national transposition law of each Member State. This assessment delivers the directive-level baseline; flag national-specific overlays separately.
Usage
/eu-nis2:assess [--scope=<scope>] [--sources=<connector-list>]
Arguments
--scope=<scope>(optional) — narrow the assessment to a specific part of the directive. Valid values:governance— Article 20 (management-body accountability) only.article-21— all ten cybersecurity risk-management measures (Article 21(2)(a)–(j)). Default.risk-policies— Article 21(2)(a).incident-handling— Article 21(2)(b).business-continuity— Article 21(2)(c).supply-chain— Article 21(2)(d).acquisition-development— Article 21(2)(e).effectiveness— Article 21(2)(f).cyber-hygiene— Article 21(2)(g).cryptography— Article 21(2)(h).hr-access-asset— Article 21(2)(i).mfa-comms— Article 21(2)(j).reporting— Article 23 incident-reporting workflow readiness only.annex— overlay Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 controls (uses the companionemea-eu-nis2-annex-2024SCF crosswalk; intended for digital-infrastructure / ICT-service-management / digital-provider entities).
--sources=<connector-list>(optional) — comma-separated connector plugins to draw findings from (aws-inspector,gcp-inspector,github-inspector,okta-inspector, etc.).
Pre-assessment confirmation
Before running, confirm the following with the user. Any of these missing makes the assessment less actionable.
- Entity classification — Has
/eu-nis2:scopebeen run? What is the classification (essential, important, or both)? Which Annex I or II sectors apply? - Member State(s) of operation — Each Member State has its own transposition law and competent authority. Capture all of them; the assessment can flag where national rules diverge from the directive baseline.
- DORA pre-emption check — If the entity is a financial entity in scope of DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554), DORA pre-empts NIS2 on ICT risk management, incident reporting, threat-led penetration testing, and ICT third-party risk. The assessment should de-scope those topics from NIS2 and route them to a DORA workflow.
- CER co-designation check — If the entity is qualified as a "critical entity" under the CER Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2557), the CER physical-resilience obligations apply alongside NIS2. CER controls are out of scope for this assessment.
- Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 applicability — For the digital-infrastructure / ICT-service-management / digital-provider categories, the technical controls in the Implementing Regulation are the operative compliance text. Add
--scope=annexto overlay them.
What the assessment produces
- Compliance score — overall NIS2 readiness percentage, weighted by mapped SCF controls.
- Applicable-requirements summary — which Article 21 domains are in scope (always all ten for in-scope entities); whether the Annex implementing-act controls apply.
- Article-by-article gap — every Article 21 domain and the Article 23 reporting workflow, with pass / partial / gap status from connector findings and narrative evidence.
- Article 20 governance gap — board approval, oversight cadence, training completion, designated responsibility.
- Article 23 reporting readiness — IR runbook aligned to 24h/72h/1mo? Significant-incident classification scheme defined? Past submissions on file? CSIRT / competent-authority contact tree current?
- Evidence gaps — controls where no evidence source is configured (manual or connector).
- Remediation roadmap — prioritised by domain criticality and effort. Quick wins surfaced separately (typically MFA enforcement gaps, IR runbook timing updates, board-approval paperwork).
Delegation
Under the hood:
/grc-engineer:gap-assessment "emea-eu-nis2-2022" [--sources=<connector-list>]
The SCF crosswalk expands 68 SCF controls into the 30 NIS2 directive-level controls. Add --scope=annex to use the companion emea-eu-nis2-annex-2024 crosswalk for the 351-control Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 breakdown.
Output structure
The assessment is structured by Article 21 domain (rather than by SCF family) so the output maps directly to what a national supervisor will ask about. Example shape:
| Article 21 domain | SCF families | Status | Evidence gap | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21(2)(a) Risk policies | RSK, GOV, AST | Partial | Risk register lacks supplier-risk integration | Extend register; quarterly review |
| 21(2)(b) Incident handling | IRO, MON | Partial | IR runbook predates NIS2; not aligned to 24h/72h/1mo | Update runbook; tabletop with new timing |
| 21(2)(c) Business continuity | BCD | Implemented | DR test reports current | Continue cadence |
| 21(2)(d) Supply chain | TPM, RSK | Gap | No supplier-risk register; contracts lack security clauses | Build register; update contract templates |
| 21(2)(e) SDLC / vulnerability mgmt | CHG, VPM, TDA | Partial | Patch SLAs not enforced for medium-severity | Tighten SLAs; track exceptions |
| 21(2)(f) Effectiveness | CPL, MON, RSK | Partial | Internal audit covers IT; not yet covering Article 21 explicitly | Add NIS2 module to internal audit plan |
| 21(2)(g) Cyber hygiene + training | SAT, HRS | Implemented | Workforce training current | Add management-body training records (Article 20) |
| 21(2)(h) Cryptography | CRY, IAC | Implemented | Encryption at rest / in transit deployed | Verify post-quantum agility plan |
| 21(2)(i) HR / access / asset | IAC, HRS, AST | Partial | Quarterly access reviews not running for legacy systems | Bring legacy systems into review cycle |
| 21(2)(j) MFA / secured comms | IAC, NET, END | Partial | MFA gaps for service accounts | Move to phishing-resistant MFA; close service-account gaps |
| Article 20 governance | GOV | Gap | Board has not formally approved Article 21 measures | Place item on next board meeting; add to oversight cadence |
| Article 23 reporting readiness | IRO | Partial | Runbook does not pre-populate national reporting-portal fields | Build a Member-State-specific submission template |
Status categories: Implemented (no gap), Partial (improvements needed), Gap (not implemented), N/A (not applicable to entity).
Framework-specific notes
Most-commonly-requested scopes:
- First-time NIS2 readiness: full
--scope=article-21assessment, plusgovernanceandreportingoverlays. - For digital-infrastructure / ICT-service-management / digital-provider entities: add
--scope=annexto overlay Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 controls — these entities are subject to the more detailed technical breakdown. - Pre-incident-reporting drill: targeted
--scope=incident-handlingand--scope=reportingto validate the 24h/72h/1mo runbook against the national portal requirements. - Board pack preparation:
--scope=governanceto surface Article 20 evidence gaps before the next board meeting.
Known interactions with sibling frameworks:
- DORA is lex specialis for in-scope financial entities. Where an Article 21 domain is fully covered by DORA (notably ICT risk management, incident reporting, threat-led penetration testing, and ICT third-party risk), the NIS2 assessment should defer to the DORA assessment for that topic and avoid double-counting.
- GDPR overlaps on incident reporting. A single event can trigger both Article 23 (NIS2, 24h/72h/1mo to the CSIRT) and Article 33 (GDPR, 72h to the DPA). The assessment should remind users to evaluate both regimes for every reportable event.
- CER (Critical Entities Resilience Directive) co-applies for entities qualified as critical entities. CER physical-resilience controls are out of scope here.
- eIDAS trust-service-provider obligations sit alongside NIS2 obligations for those providers; supervision is coordinated under Article 32(7).
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022: a certified ISMS is widely treated as good prima facie evidence of the Article 21 domains, but is not a safe harbour. The assessment will still expect explicit mapping to NIS2's specific concerns (especially supply chain and incident reporting timing).
Mandatory cadence:
- The directive does not set a single recertification cycle. National laws and ISMS practice typically drive annual review of the Article 21 measures, annual or more-frequent management-body training, and event-driven re-assessment after material changes.
- Six-monthly aggregated incident statistics from competent authorities to the Commission and ENISA (Article 23(9)).
- Commission review of NIS2 itself by 17 October 2027 and every 36 months thereafter (Article 40).
Common misinterpretations the assessment corrects:
- Treating Article 23 as "GDPR-style 72-hour reporting" — it is a three-stage 24h/72h/1mo flow. The assessment flags IR runbooks that lack the 24-hour early-warning step.
- Treating Article 21 as an ISO 27001 mapping exercise — Article 21(2)(d) supply chain and Article 23 reporting require explicit NIS2-shaped evidence, not just an ISO Annex A reference.
- Treating Article 20 as just management-body training — the assessment also checks for board approval and oversight cadence evidence.
- Treating size-threshold ineligibility as a definitive out-of-scope answer — the assessment runs the Article 2(2) override checks (trust services, DNS, public electronic communications, sole provider, CER critical entity, central-government public administration).
SCF crosswalk
This assessment uses the Secure Controls Framework crosswalk for emea-eu-nis2-2022 (the directive itself, 68 SCF → 30 directive controls) and optionally emea-eu-nis2-annex-2024 (Implementing Regulation 2024/2690 technical breakdown, 351 controls).
- SCF ID (directive):
emea-eu-nis2-2022 - SCF ID (Annex implementing act):
emea-eu-nis2-annex-2024 - Region: EMEA
- Depth: Reference (tier 2 of 3)
Related commands
/eu-nis2:scope— entity classification and applicability decision tree (run this first)./eu-nis2:evidence-checklist— evidence list organised by Article 21 domain and Article 23 reporting workflow./grc-engineer:gap-assessment— direct access to the SCF-backed gap assessment.
Citations
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 — Articles 2 (scope), 3 (essential vs important), 20 (governance), 21 (risk-management measures), 23 (incident reporting), 26 (jurisdiction), 27 (registry of digital-infrastructure entities at ENISA), 32–34 (supervision and enforcement).
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 — technical and methodological requirements for digital-infrastructure / ICT-service-management / digital-provider entities under Article 21(5).
- Recommendation 2003/361/EC — definition of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises used by the size threshold in Article 2(1).
- National transposition laws of each Member State of operation — the operative legal text for enforcement.
EU NIS2 Evidence Checklist
Baseline evidence checklist for a NIS2 assessment. Organised by the ten Article 21 cybersecurity risk-management domains that every Member State's transposition law requires in-scope entities to address, plus the Article 20 management-body evidence and the Article 23 incident-reporting workflow. The SCF crosswalk maps 68 SCF controls to the 30 NIS2 directive-level controls; this command pairs each Article 21 domain with the SCF families and connectors that automate evidence collection.
Usage
/eu-nis2:evidence-checklist [--domain=<article-21-domain>] [--include-annex]
Arguments
--domain=<article-21-domain>(optional) — restrict to a single Article 21(2) domain. Valid values:risk-policies,incident-handling,business-continuity,supply-chain,acquisition-development,effectiveness,cyber-hygiene,cryptography,hr-access-asset,mfa-comms,governance,reporting. Defaults to all.--include-annex(optional) — when set, expand each domain with the corresponding controls from Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 (the NIS2 "Annex" implementing act) using theemea-eu-nis2-annex-2024SCF crosswalk. Use this for entities in the digital-infrastructure / ICT-service-management / digital-provider categories.
Output
Markdown checklist grouped by Article 21 domain (and optionally by Annex implementing-act control family) with:
- Domain → Article 21(2)(letter) citation → SCF family → SCF control IDs (from the crosswalk).
- Evidence types typically expected (policy documents, registers, logs, tickets, configurations, training records, board minutes).
- Which connector plugins (
aws-inspector,gcp-inspector,github-inspector,okta-inspector, etc.) can collect each evidence type automatically. - Which items require manual upload / narrative (governance evidence, contracts, board approvals).
- Retention guidance — NIS2 itself does not set a single retention period; the plugin defers to the Member State transposition law and to the entity's ISMS retention rules. Most national supervisors expect at least the audit cycle plus the limitation period for administrative fines (commonly 5 years).
Article 20 — Management-body governance evidence
NIS2 makes the management body legally accountable for cybersecurity. Evidence here is unusually high-stakes because a national supervisor will typically open with: "show me that your board approved the Article 21 measures and is overseeing implementation."
| Evidence | Source / format | Auditor expectation |
|---|---|---|
| Board minutes approving the Article 21 cybersecurity risk-management measures | Board pack, signed minutes | Date-stamped, with the specific resolution; must reference the Article 21 measures, not just "the security policy" |
| Board minutes showing periodic oversight of the cybersecurity programme | Quarterly or annual cadence | Evidence that the board is reviewing KPIs, incidents, exceptions, and the risk register — not just receiving a status update |
| Cybersecurity training completion records for the management body | LMS export, training-vendor certificates | Article 20(2) requires training "to gain sufficient knowledge and skills" |
| Cascade training plan and completion records for employees | LMS, training calendar, attendance records | Article 21(2)(g) — basic cyber-hygiene practices and cybersecurity training |
| Job description / mandate of the cybersecurity programme owner | Org chart, role description | National laws often require a designated person; may be CISO or equivalent |
| Risk-treatment plan signed off by the management body | Risk register extract, signed cover sheet | Demonstrates that the board approved the risk-management approach, not just the policy |
Article 21(2)(a) — Risk analysis and information system security policies
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Cybersecurity policy (master) approved by the management body | PDF, version-controlled |
| Risk-analysis methodology document | ISO 27005-aligned or equivalent |
| Risk register with current entries | GRC tool export (CSV/JSON) |
| Asset inventory linked to risk register | CMDB export, cloud asset inventory |
| Information classification scheme | Policy document |
| Periodic risk-analysis review records | Meeting minutes, risk-committee outputs |
SCF families typically referenced: RSK (risk management), GOV (governance), AST (asset management).
Article 21(2)(b) — Incident handling
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Incident response plan / runbook | Document, with a NIS2-specific section for the 24h/72h/1mo timeline |
| Incident classification scheme distinguishing significant incidents (Article 23 trigger) | Annex to the IR plan |
| Incident register / ticketing-system extract | Jira/ServiceNow/SOAR export |
| Detection capability evidence (SIEM, EDR, NDR coverage) | Tool inventory, detection-rule export |
| Tabletop exercise reports (cyber, ransomware, supply-chain) | Exercise after-action reports |
| Post-incident reviews for past significant incidents | PIR documents |
| Copies of past Article 23 submissions (early warning, notification, final report) | Portal exports / signed copies |
SCF families: IRO (incident response operations), MON (monitoring).
Article 21(2)(c) — Business continuity and crisis management
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Business impact analysis covering NIS2-covered services | BIA document |
| Backup management policy | Policy document |
| Backup test reports (most recent) | Test logs |
| Disaster-recovery plan with RTO/RPO per service | DR plan document |
| DR test reports (most recent) | Test reports, lessons learned |
| Crisis-management plan (org-wide) | Document, with cyber-specific annex |
| Business-continuity exercise records | Exercise reports |
SCF families: BCD (business continuity and disaster recovery), CRP (cryptographic protections — for backup encryption).
Article 21(2)(d) — Supply-chain security
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Supplier inventory (ICT and ICT-adjacent suppliers) | Procurement system export |
| Supplier risk-rating methodology | Methodology document |
| Supplier risk register with current ratings | Register extract |
| Standard security clauses in supplier contracts | Contract templates, master service agreements |
| Right-to-audit / SOC2-acceptance / ISO27001-acceptance evidence per critical supplier | Vendor questionnaires, third-party assessment reports |
| Subcontractor / fourth-party tracking for material suppliers | Supplier questionnaire responses |
| Process for handling vulnerabilities in supplier products/services | Documented procedure |
| Cooperation Group Article 22 coordinated risk-assessment outputs that affect the entity | Reference to published assessments |
SCF families: TPM (third-party management), RSK.
Article 21(2)(e) — Security in network and information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Secure development lifecycle policy | Policy document |
| Security requirements in procurement / SDLC stage gates | Procurement checklist, stage-gate template |
| Vulnerability management policy and SLA | Policy document |
| Vulnerability scan reports (most recent) | Scanner exports (network, infra, app) |
| Penetration testing reports (most recent, plus remediation evidence) | Pentest report |
| Patch management evidence (deployment success rate, time-to-patch by severity) | Patch tooling export |
Coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy / security.txt / VDP page | Public policy URL |
| Change-management records for production changes | Change tickets export |
SCF families: CHG (change management), VPM (vulnerability and patch management), TDA (technology development & acquisition).
Article 21(2)(f) — Effectiveness assessment
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Internal audit programme covering cybersecurity controls | Audit charter, audit calendar |
| Internal audit reports (most recent cycle) | Audit reports |
| Control-testing programme outputs (sampling, results) | Test logs |
| Cybersecurity KPIs / KRIs reported to management | Metrics dashboard export |
| Management review minutes for the cybersecurity programme | Meeting minutes |
| External assessment reports (penetration test, red team, ISO 27001 certification audit, SOC 2) | Reports, certificates |
| Corrective-action tracking from prior assessments | Action register |
SCF families: CPL (compliance), MON, RSK.
Article 21(2)(g) — Cyber hygiene and training
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Cyber-hygiene baseline standard (passwords, MFA, patching, backups, phishing-resistance) | Standard document |
| Security awareness training curriculum | Curriculum outline |
| Training completion records (overall workforce + role-based + management body) | LMS export |
| Phishing simulation results (most recent) | Simulation tool export |
| New-joiner security onboarding records | HR system export |
| Specialist training records for privileged roles (admins, developers, IR team) | Certifications, attendance records |
SCF families: SAT (security awareness and training), HRS (human resources security).
Article 21(2)(h) — Cryptography
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Cryptographic policy (algorithms, key lengths, modes, key-management) | Policy document |
| Encryption-at-rest evidence per data store | Cloud-provider config exports, SIEM compliance findings |
| Encryption-in-transit evidence per public-facing service | TLS scan results, load-balancer configs |
| Key-management evidence (KMS/HSM inventory, rotation logs) | KMS configuration export |
| Certificate inventory and lifecycle evidence | Certificate-management tool export |
| Cryptographic-agility plan (post-quantum readiness, where appropriate) | Plan document |
SCF families: CRY (cryptography), IAC (identity and access control).
Article 21(2)(i) — HR security, access control, asset management
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| Joiner/mover/leaver process documentation | Procedure document |
| HR-to-IAM provisioning evidence (sample tickets) | Identity-system audit log |
| Periodic access-review evidence (most recent cycle, by application/system) | Access-review tool export |
| Privileged-access management evidence (PAM session logs, vault inventory) | PAM tool export |
| Segregation-of-duties matrix and exception register | Matrix document, exceptions register |
| Background-check policy (where lawful in the Member State) and execution evidence | Policy + sample records |
| Asset inventory with ownership per asset | CMDB / cloud asset inventory |
| Acceptable-use policy with employee acknowledgement | Policy + signed acknowledgements (or digital equivalent) |
SCF families: IAC, HRS, AST.
Article 21(2)(j) — Multi-factor authentication, secured comms, secured emergency comms
| Evidence | Source / format |
|---|---|
| MFA enforcement evidence for all administrative and remote access | IdP configuration export, MFA coverage report |
| Continuous-authentication or risk-based authentication where deployed | IdP policy export |
| Secured email / messaging baseline (DMARC/DKIM/SPF, transport encryption, internal messaging hardening) | DNS records, mail-flow configuration |
| Secured voice/video baseline (provider security posture, encryption-in-transit) | Vendor security pack, configuration |
| Emergency-communication system (out-of-band channel for incident response) | Documented IR contact tree, OOB channel inventory |
SCF families: IAC, NET (network defense), END (endpoint security).
Article 23 — Incident reporting workflow evidence
The 24h/72h/1mo timeline is itself an evidence-generating workflow. For every reportable incident the plugin records:
| Stage | Artifact | Required content (Article 23(4)) |
|---|---|---|
| Early warning | 24-hour submission to the national CSIRT / competent authority | Whether the incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts; whether it could have a cross-border impact |
| Incident notification | 72-hour submission | Update on the early warning; initial assessment of severity and impact; where available, indicators of compromise |
| Final report | 1-month submission (or interim report at 1 month + final after handling) | Detailed incident description; type of threat / root cause; mitigation measures applied and ongoing; cross-border impact (where applicable) |
| Recipients of services notification | Where appropriate (Article 23(2)) | Notification to recipients adversely affected; for significant cyber threats, notification of the threat and any measures or remedies recipients can take |
Maintain a register that, for each incident, contains: detection time, awareness time, classification rationale (significant or not), submission timestamps and reference numbers, copies of the submissions, recipients-of-services notifications, and the post-incident review.
Connector coverage notes
The Tier-1 connector plugins (aws-inspector, gcp-inspector, github-inspector, okta-inspector) emit findings that map to the SCF families above and are particularly useful for:
- Article 21(2)(h) — encryption at rest / in transit configuration evidence (cloud connectors).
- Article 21(2)(i)–(j) — IAM, MFA, access-review evidence (
okta-inspector, cloud connectors). - Article 21(2)(b) — log/SIEM coverage and detection control evidence (cloud connectors for log destinations and retention).
- Article 21(2)(e) — vulnerability findings and patch state (cloud connectors,
github-inspectorfor code-level findings).
Governance evidence (Article 20 board minutes, training records, supplier contracts, tabletop exercise reports) is manual-upload territory. Plan for narrative evidence to make up roughly half of a NIS2 evidence pack.
EU NIS2 Scope
Determines whether the EU NIS2 Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2555) applies to the organisation, and if so whether the organisation is classified as essential (Annex I) or important (Annex II). Reference-depth scope is a structured walkthrough of the Article 2 and Article 3 decision tree; Full-depth plugins extend this with national-law-aware logic per Member State.
NIS2 is a Directive, not a Regulation. The substantive rules a regulator can enforce against the organisation live in the national transposition law of each EU Member State. This command gives the directive-level verdict; for definitive in-or-out determinations always consult the national transposition law of every Member State in which the organisation operates a NIS2-covered service.
Usage
/eu-nis2:scope
What this produces
- Applicability verdict — In-scope / out-of-scope / partially in-scope, with the Article 2 trigger that led there.
- Entity classification — Essential (Annex I sector + size threshold) / Important (Annex II sector + size threshold) / Both (multi-sector organisations may have parts of the organisation in different tiers).
- Sector mapping — which NIS2 sector (or sectors) the organisation operates in, and the specific subsector under Annex I or II.
- Size-threshold finding — whether the entity meets the medium-enterprise threshold from Recommendation 2003/361/EC (≥50 employees OR ≥€10M annual turnover/balance sheet).
- Carve-out flags — whether any Article 2(2) override applies (trust services, DNS/TLD, public electronic communications, sole provider, CER critical entity, central-government public administration). These pull the entity in regardless of size.
- Member-State touchpoints — for each Member State the organisation operates in, the national competent authority and CSIRT to engage with, plus a flag on transposition status as known.
- Registration obligations — whether the entity must register with the national competent authority and (for digital infrastructure / ICT service management / digital providers) with ENISA under Article 27.
- Next steps — typically
/eu-nis2:evidence-checklistto enumerate Article 21 evidence requirements and/eu-nis2:assessto run the SCF-backed gap assessment.
Decision tree
The plugin walks through these checks in order. Stop at the first definitive verdict.
Step 1 — Sector check (Article 2(1) and Annexes I & II)
Ask: "Which of the NIS2 sectors does the organisation operate in?" Multiple sectors are common — capture all of them.
Annex I sectors (default classification: essential):
- Energy (electricity, district heating and cooling, oil, gas, hydrogen)
- Transport (air, rail, water, road)
- Banking (credit institutions)
- Financial market infrastructures (trading venues, central counterparties)
- Health (healthcare providers; EU reference labs; R&D for medicinal products; manufacturers of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations; manufacturers of critical medical devices)
- Drinking water (suppliers and distributors)
- Wastewater (collection, disposal, treatment)
- Digital infrastructure (IXPs, DNS providers excl. root servers, TLD name registries, cloud computing services, data centre services, content delivery networks, trust service providers, providers of public electronic communications networks/services)
- ICT service management B2B (managed service providers, managed security service providers)
- Public administration (central government and certain regional government, scope set by Member State)
- Space (operators of ground-based infrastructure)
Annex II sectors (default classification: important):
- Postal and courier services
- Waste management
- Manufacture, production and distribution of chemicals
- Production, processing and distribution of food
- Manufacturing — medical devices and IVD; computer/electronic/optical products; electrical equipment; machinery and equipment; motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers; other transport equipment
- Digital providers (online marketplaces, online search engines, social networking services platforms)
- Research organisations
If the organisation is in none of these sectors, it is out of scope under the directive baseline. (Member States may widen scope under Article 2(2)(d)–(e); flag this as a residual risk and re-check the national law.)
Step 2 — Size-threshold check (Article 2(1) and Recommendation 2003/361/EC)
Ask: "Does the entity meet the medium-enterprise threshold?"
- ≥ 50 employees, OR
- annual turnover and annual balance sheet total both above €10 million
Apply the threshold at the entity level, not at the corporate group level (with the group-aggregation rules in Recommendation 2003/361/EC for partner and linked enterprises). If the entity meets the medium threshold:
- Annex I sector → Essential entity.
- Annex II sector → Important entity.
If the entity is below the medium threshold, do not stop yet — go to Step 3.
Step 3 — Size-independent override check (Article 2(2))
The size threshold is overridden for any of the following — these entities are in scope regardless of size:
- Qualified and non-qualified trust service providers under eIDAS.
- TLD name registries and DNS service providers (excluding root servers).
- Providers of public electronic communications networks and publicly available electronic communications services.
- Sole providers in a Member State of a service that is essential for the maintenance of critical societal or economic activities.
- Entities providing services on which the Member State's economy or constitutional order depends, as identified by the Member State.
- Entities qualified as critical entities under the CER Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2557).
- Public administration entities of central government as designated by the Member State.
- Public administration entities at regional level as designated by the Member State (some Member States include all regions; others only certain ones).
- Where the Member State so provides, entities providing domain-name registration services.
If any of these applies, the entity is in scope regardless of headcount or turnover. Most are classified as essential, but verify via Annex I vs II for the sector.
Step 4 — Member-State-discretionary additions (Article 2(2)(d)–(e))
Member States may classify additional entities as essential or important based on the role they play in the national economy. Examples in early transposition laws:
- Some Member States include all of central and regional public administration; others only ministries and federal-level agencies.
- Some Member States include educational institutions in research scope; others do not.
- Some Member States explicitly extend scope to specific industries (e.g., automotive supply chain in Germany; defence-industrial base in France's transposition).
Check the national transposition law of each Member State the organisation operates in. The plugin cannot give a definitive answer at the directive level for these discretionary categories.
Step 5 — Member-State-discretionary exclusions
Limited carve-outs are available for entities providing services exclusively to defence or national security. National security is outside the EU's competence, so Member States can choose to exclude or apply a different regime to entities supporting national-security functions. This is narrow — most dual-use organisations do not qualify.
Multi-Member-State organisations
NIS2 applies wherever the entity is established in the Union. Article 26 sets jurisdiction:
- For most entity types: the Member State of the entity's main establishment.
- For DNS service providers, TLD name registries, entities providing domain-name registration services, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines, and of social networking services platforms: the Member State of the main establishment in the Union (with Article 26(2) tie-breakers).
- An entity not established in the Union but offering services within the Union must designate a representative in one of the Member States in which it offers services.
For each Member State of operation, the plugin records: competent authority, CSIRT, transposition-law citation, registration deadline, and any national-specific obligations (mandatory CISO appointment, sectoral reporting portals, etc.).
What the verdict does not cover
- Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 controls — for entities in scope of the digital-infrastructure / ICT-service-management / digital-provider categories, the Annex implementing act sets detailed technical and methodological requirements. Use the companion
emea-eu-nis2-annex-2024SCF crosswalk. - DORA pre-emption — for in-scope financial entities, DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) is lex specialis and pre-empts NIS2 on ICT risk management, incident reporting, threat-led penetration testing, and ICT third-party risk. The plugin flags this; route to a DORA workflow for the overlapping topics.
- CER co-designation — entities qualified as critical entities under CER are automatically in NIS2 scope as essential. The CER physical-resilience obligations are not covered by this plugin.
- Sector-specific national rules — many Member States preserve pre-NIS2 sectoral regimes (for example, Germany's KRITIS rules, France's LPM-OIV regime). Read them alongside the NIS2 transposition law.
Sponsors
Details
- Marketplace
- GRCEngClub/claude-grc-engineering
- Source
- plugins/frameworks/eu-nis2
- Category
- Community
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