
nist-csf-20
NIST Cybersecurity Framework (v2.0) — reference-depth plugin backed by the SCF crosswalk (250 SCF → 134 framework controls).
- version
- 0.1.0
- GitHub stars
- 436
Install
/plugin install nist-csf-20@grc-engineering-suiteRun it inside Claude Code after adding the marketplace with /plugin marketplace add GRCEngClub/claude-grc-engineering.
Contents
Discovered from sourceSkills 1
NIST Cybersecurity Framework (v2.0) Expert
Reference-depth expertise for NIST Cybersecurity Framework v2.0 — the cross-sector outcomes-based framework published by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology. CSF 2.0 is the most widely adopted cybersecurity framework in the United States and is increasingly used worldwide as a common vocabulary for board-level and regulator-facing cybersecurity discussions.
This plugin bundles the SCF crosswalk (250 SCF controls → 134 CSF Subcategories) with framework-specific scope, assessment, and evidence guidance.
Framework identity
- SCF framework ID:
general-nist-csf-2-0 - Publisher: NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), U.S. Department of Commerce
- Version: 2.0 (final)
- Released: February 26, 2024 (supersedes CSF 1.1, April 2018)
- Region: Global (U.S.-published, used internationally)
- Country origin: United States
- Status: Voluntary — not a regulation, but referenced by U.S. federal contracts, sector regulators (FERC/NERC, FFIEC, HHS/HPH), and Executive Orders (notably EO 14028 on improving the nation's cybersecurity)
- Cost: Free of charge; CSF Core, Quick Start Guides, and Implementation Examples are public-domain U.S. government works
- Successor relationship: CSF 2.0 supersedes CSF 1.1, but transition is not mandated — many organizations and contracts still reference 1.1 in 2026
Framework in plain language
CSF 2.0 is a cybersecurity outcomes framework, not a control catalog. Its job is to give an organization a small, common vocabulary it can use to (a) describe what cybersecurity outcomes it currently achieves, (b) describe what it wants to achieve, and (c) plan the gap between the two. The framework deliberately avoids prescribing how to achieve outcomes — that's what control catalogs like NIST SP 800-53, ISO 27001 Annex A, and CIS Controls are for. CSF cites those catalogs as Informative References.
The headline change in CSF 2.0 is the addition of the Govern (GV) Function. CSF 1.1 had five Functions — Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover — which describe the lifecycle of a cybersecurity event. CSF 2.0 adds Govern as a cross-cutting Function that holds the board, executives, and risk-management processes accountable for the cybersecurity program itself, not just for responding to events. This change reflects what regulators, boards, and the SEC's 2023 cybersecurity disclosure rule have been pushing for years.
Territorial scope and applicability
CSF is voluntary and cross-sector. It does not impose territorial obligations on its own. Practical sweet spots where it's the right framework to reach for:
- U.S. federal contractors before they're mature enough for full NIST SP 800-53 compliance — CSF gives them a defensible structure and a glide path
- Critical infrastructure operators under EO 14028 and sector-specific guidance (energy, water, transportation, healthcare, financial services) — CSF is the U.S. government's preferred shared vocabulary
- Healthcare and finance organizations that already comply with HIPAA, GLBA, or PCI DSS and want a board-readable summary that maps cleanly to those underlying frameworks
- Mid-market organizations building a first formal cybersecurity program — CSF Tier 1 → Tier 2 → Tier 3 progression scales gracefully
- International organizations using CSF as a U.S.-aligned reference alongside ISO/IEC 27001 (Informative References include ISO 27001:2022 mappings)
- Private-sector boards and audit committees who want a single page of "what we do for cybersecurity" that is not a 1,200-control spreadsheet
CSF is not a substitute for sectoral regulation. A hospital still owes HIPAA Security Rule compliance regardless of its CSF posture; a bank still owes GLBA Safeguards Rule; a defense contractor still owes CMMC. CSF sits above those — it's the shared language a CISO uses to explain the program to a board that doesn't read CFR citations.
The CSF Core: Functions, Categories, Subcategories
CSF is organized hierarchically. The Core has three layers:
1. Functions (6)
The Functions are the highest-level grouping and the single most important thing to memorize. CSF 2.0 has six:
| Code | Function | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
| GV | Govern | Cybersecurity strategy, expectations, policy, roles, risk tolerance, supply chain risk management, oversight. New in 2.0. |
| ID | Identify | Asset management, business environment, risk assessment, improvement. Understand your context. |
| PR | Protect | Identity management and access control, awareness and training, data security, platform security, technology infrastructure resilience. |
| DE | Detect | Continuous monitoring, adverse event analysis. |
| RS | Respond | Incident management, analysis, response reporting and communication, mitigation. |
| RC | Recover | Incident recovery plan execution, recovery communication. |
The mnemonic the community uses is GIPDRR (or G + IPDRR, since IPDRR was the CSF 1.x ordering). Note that Govern is not the first Function executed during an incident — it's the wrapper around all the others. In Profile work and assessments, Govern outcomes are typically written and approved before the Identify/Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover capabilities are stood up, but in continuous operation Govern runs in parallel with everything else.
2. Categories
Each Function decomposes into Categories. Categories are coded as <Function>.<Category>. Examples that come up constantly in practice:
- GV.OC — Organizational Context (mission, stakeholder expectations, legal/regulatory requirements, threat landscape)
- GV.RM — Risk Management Strategy (risk tolerance, risk appetite statements, integration with enterprise risk)
- GV.RR — Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (RACI for cybersecurity decisions)
- GV.PO — Policy
- GV.OV — Oversight (board reporting, independent review)
- GV.SC — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM, expanded substantially from CSF 1.1's ID.SC)
- ID.AM — Asset Management
- ID.RA — Risk Assessment
- ID.IM — Improvement (lessons learned, continuous improvement)
- PR.AA — Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control
- PR.AT — Awareness and Training
- PR.DS — Data Security
- PR.PS — Platform Security
- PR.IR — Technology Infrastructure Resilience
- DE.CM — Continuous Monitoring
- DE.AE — Adverse Event Analysis
- RS.MA — Incident Management
- RS.AN — Incident Analysis
- RS.CO — Incident Response Reporting and Communication
- RS.MI — Incident Mitigation
- RC.RP — Incident Recovery Plan Execution
- RC.CO — Incident Recovery Communication
Total Categories in CSF 2.0: 22 (compared to 23 in CSF 1.1 — the structure was rebalanced as part of the Govern restructuring).
3. Subcategories
Subcategories are the leaf nodes — concrete cybersecurity outcomes phrased as statements (not directives). CSF 2.0 has 106 official Subcategories. The SCF crosswalk used by this plugin resolves those outcomes into 134 mappable entries for assessment and reporting. CSF Subcategories are coded as <Function>.<Category>-<Number>. Examples:
- GV.OC-01 — The organizational mission is understood and informs cybersecurity risk management
- PR.AA-01 — Identities and credentials for authorized users, services, and hardware are managed by the organization
- DE.CM-01 — Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events
- RS.MA-01 — The incident response plan is executed in coordination with relevant third parties once an incident is declared
Subcategories are the assessment unit. When practitioners say "we're at Partial on PR.AA-01 and Repeatable on DE.CM-01," they're scoring at the Subcategory level. This plugin's evidence-checklist command covers all 106 Subcategories, organized by Function → Category.
Implementation Examples (new in 2.0)
CSF 2.0 introduced Implementation Examples — short, concrete actions an organization can take to achieve a Subcategory's outcome. These are intentionally not exhaustive and not prescriptive; they're a starting point. They are published in the NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool alongside each Subcategory.
Implementation Examples are not the same as Informative References. References point to other catalogs (NIST SP 800-53, ISO 27001:2022, CIS Controls v8, etc.); Examples describe actions an organization can take directly. Cite Implementation Examples by Subcategory ID and the example's enumeration in the published CSF 2.0 Reference Tool — do not paste the Example text verbatim into customer-facing artifacts.
Profiles: the primary practitioner workflow
The Profile is where CSF stops being theoretical and starts being useful. A Profile is just a list of Subcategories with annotations. The practitioner workflow:
- Current Profile — Walk every (in-scope) Subcategory. For each, document:
- Which controls / processes / tools currently meet the outcome
- The maturity / completeness of that implementation (often expressed via Tier or a custom rubric)
- Evidence that demonstrates it (logs, configs, policies, tickets)
- Gaps and blockers
- Target Profile — Decide which Subcategories the organization wants to achieve, and to what degree. Targets are informed by:
- Mission, business objectives, threat landscape (GV.OC outcomes)
- Risk tolerance and appetite (GV.RM outcomes)
- Legal and regulatory obligations (GV.OC-03)
- Cost / benefit, capacity to execute
- Gap analysis — The delta between Current and Target. This becomes the prioritized backlog for the next fiscal year (or whatever planning cycle the organization uses).
- Action plan / roadmap — Initiatives with owners, milestones, budget asks, and Subcategory-level success criteria.
- Reassessment cadence — Most organizations reassess the Current Profile annually, with quarterly or monthly check-ins on initiatives in flight.
CSF 2.0 publishes Community Profiles for specific contexts (e.g., manufacturing, election security, electric grid). Community Profiles are pre-built Target Profiles maintained by NIST or industry working groups; using one short-circuits a lot of the "what should our Target Profile look like?" debate. Always check whether a Community Profile exists for the organization's sector before building one from scratch.
Tiers (1–4): rigor of risk management practices, NOT maturity
This is the single most-misunderstood part of CSF. The Tiers describe how rigorous and integrated the organization's cybersecurity risk management practices are — not how many controls it has, not how technically mature its security tooling is.
| Tier | Name | Plain-language description |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Partial | Risk management is ad hoc, reactive, often informal. Awareness limited. Governance and supply chain risk practices not formalized. |
| 2 | Risk Informed | Risk management practices are approved by management but not established as organization-wide policy. Some prioritization happens. Governance present but inconsistent. |
| 3 | Repeatable | Risk management practices are formally approved, expressed as policy, applied consistently. Governance is regular. Supply chain risk management is integrated. Continuous awareness. |
| 4 | Adaptive | Risk management practices adapt to changing threats based on lessons learned and predictive indicators. Cybersecurity risk is integrated into enterprise risk culture. Continuous improvement. |
Two critical points:
- Tier 4 is not the goal for every organization. A Tier 2 posture may be entirely appropriate for a small business with low risk exposure. Pushing a Tier 1 organization to Tier 4 in one cycle is unrealistic and usually counterproductive.
- Tiers are not assigned per Subcategory — they characterize the organization's overall risk-management practice. Subcategory implementations are scored separately (typically against a custom rubric in the Current/Target Profile work).
Informative References
CSF 2.0 Subcategories map to other widely-used catalogs through Informative References. These are maintained in the NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool and updated periodically. The official mappings include (non-exhaustive):
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 — controls catalog used by U.S. federal systems and FedRAMP
- NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 3 — controls for protecting CUI in non-federal systems (relevant to CMMC)
- NIST SP 800-221A — enterprise risk management for cybersecurity
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — Annex A controls
- CIS Controls v8 — community-curated control set
- COBIT 2019 — IT governance framework
Treat Informative References as a starting point, not a substitute for the underlying frameworks. If an organization is implementing controls to satisfy ISO 27001:2022 certification, the ISO standard's normative text governs — CSF references it, but auditors against ISO 27001 will assess against the ISO text directly.
Cadence and timelines
CSF itself doesn't impose timelines (it's voluntary), but practitioners should plan around:
- Annual Profile reassessment — refresh Current Profile, validate Target Profile, recompute gap. Common alignment with fiscal year for budget asks.
- Quarterly initiative review — review the action plan, update Subcategory status for items in flight.
- Triggered reassessment — material changes (new business line, M&A, major incident, new regulation, significant supply chain shift) should trigger a partial reassessment of affected Functions.
- Board reporting cadence — most CISOs report Function-level summary metrics to the board quarterly or semi-annually. CSF's Function structure gives the board a stable mental model that doesn't change every quarter.
For organizations using CSF to support sector regulation (e.g., NERC CIP audits, HIPAA risk analyses, PCI DSS Reports on Compliance), the regulator's cadence governs — CSF assessment work is usually scheduled to feed into those external assessments rather than the other way around.
Regulator and enforcement
CSF is voluntary. NIST is a measurement and standards body, not a regulator, and does not enforce CSF. There are no fines, no mandatory audits, no certification body for CSF itself.
What CSF posture does affect:
- Federal contracts — solicitations increasingly request a "CSF Profile" or "CSF Tier" as an attachment. Misrepresentation here can become a False Claims Act issue.
- Sector regulator examinations — FERC/NERC (energy), FFIEC (banking), HHS/HPH (healthcare), TSA (transportation/pipeline) reference CSF or align their examination programs with it. A weak CSF posture often correlates with weak findings in those examinations.
- State law — a few U.S. states (e.g., Connecticut, Ohio, Utah) provide affirmative defense or safe harbor in data breach litigation if the defendant followed a recognized framework like CSF. This is a litigation defense lever, not regulatory enforcement.
- Cyber insurance underwriting — carriers increasingly use CSF Function maturity as an underwriting input.
- SEC cybersecurity disclosure (Item 106 of Reg S-K) — public companies must describe their cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance. CSF's Govern Function gives a clean structure for that disclosure.
There is no CSF certification. Vendors offering "CSF certified" products or assessors are using the term loosely; NIST does not accredit or certify against CSF.
Interaction with other frameworks
CSF is designed to play well with others. Common interactions:
- CSF + NIST SP 800-53 — CSF Subcategories cite 800-53 controls as Informative References. A federal system using 800-53 baseline controls can roll those up into CSF Subcategory status. This is the canonical pairing for federal contractors.
- CSF + ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — CSF Subcategories cite ISO Annex A. Many international organizations use ISO 27001 for the certifiable ISMS and CSF as the U.S.-aligned reporting layer above it.
- CSF + CIS Controls v8 — CIS Controls are a more prescriptive, action-oriented set. Organizations often start with CIS for technical hardening and use CSF Profiles to communicate program maturity upward.
- CSF + CMMC — CMMC Levels 1/2/3 build on NIST SP 800-171/172. CSF doesn't replace CMMC, but CSF Profile work is a useful pre-engagement sanity check before a C3PAO assessment.
- CSF + HIPAA Security Rule — HHS OCR audit protocols map to CSF. Many healthcare organizations use the CSF as the umbrella and HIPAA Security Rule controls as the implementation evidence under PR/DE/RS/RC Functions.
- CSF + PCI DSS v4.0.1 — CSF doesn't satisfy PCI DSS, but PCI DSS controls map cleanly into PR.DS (data security), PR.AA (access control), DE.CM (monitoring) Subcategories.
- CSF + NIS2 (EU) — both are outcomes-oriented. NIS2 imposes obligations on essential and important entities operating in the EU; CSF can be used as the internal cybersecurity management framework that demonstrates NIS2-required risk management measures.
For multi-framework optimization and crosswalk-driven implementation work, see /grc-engineer:optimize-multi-framework and /grc-engineer:map-controls-unified.
Common misinterpretations
Reference-depth practitioners should be ready to correct these in conversations with engineers, executives, and auditors:
- "CSF tells us what controls to implement." No. CSF describes outcomes (Subcategories). Controls live in 800-53, ISO 27001 Annex A, CIS Controls v8, etc. Use CSF to organize and communicate; use a control catalog to actually implement.
- "We need to be Tier 4." Tier 4 is not the universal target. Tier 4 is appropriate for organizations with high risk exposure, mature operations, and the resources to sustain adaptive practices. Many organizations are appropriately at Tier 2 or Tier 3.
- "Tiers describe maturity per control." Tiers describe the organization's overall risk-management practice — not per-Subcategory implementation maturity. Subcategory status is scored separately.
- "CSF 2.0 is mandatory for federal contractors." Not directly. Specific contracts may require it; FAR/DFARS reference NIST SP 800-171 and (increasingly) CMMC, not CSF directly. CSF is often used in early stages of a contractor's compliance journey or as an internal management tool.
- "Govern is just policy." Govern (GV) covers strategy, expectations, policy, roles, oversight, risk management, and C-SCRM (supply chain risk). It's substantially broader than "writing policy documents."
- "CSF replaces our existing framework." It does not. CSF is a layer above existing frameworks. Most organizations keep their existing control work (ISO 27001, 800-53, HIPAA, PCI DSS, etc.) and use CSF as the communication and prioritization layer.
- "There's a CSF certification." There is not. Beware vendors marketing "CSF certified" products or services.
- "CSF 1.1 is end-of-life." CSF 2.0 supersedes 1.1, but NIST has not set a sunset date for 1.1 references. Many existing contracts, regulations, and assessment programs still reference 1.1. Plan a migration; do not panic.
Mandatory artifacts
Because CSF is voluntary and outcomes-based, there are no NIST-mandated artifacts. However, practitioner experience consistently produces (and assessors / regulators / boards consistently expect) the following deliverables when an organization claims a CSF posture:
- Current Profile — Subcategory-by-Subcategory snapshot of present-state outcomes, with evidence pointers.
- Target Profile — Subcategory-by-Subcategory desired-state outcomes, often informed by a Community Profile.
- Gap analysis — explicit delta between Current and Target, with severity / effort scoring.
- Action plan — initiatives mapped to Subcategories, with owners, milestones, budget asks.
- Tier statement — organization's self-assessed Tier (1–4) with rationale and the Tier the organization is targeting.
- Govern outputs — board-approved cybersecurity strategy, written cybersecurity policies, RACI for cybersecurity decisions, supply chain risk management process documentation.
Federal contractors and regulated entities should additionally produce mappings from their CSF Profile to the underlying regulation's control catalog (800-53, 800-171, HIPAA, PCI DSS, etc.) so that CSF artifacts can be reused as evidence across multiple compliance regimes.
Assessment workflow (what this plugin produces)
When using this plugin, the typical workflow is:
1. /nist-csf-20:scope # decide what's in scope, pick or build a Target Profile
2. /nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist # enumerate evidence per Function/Category
3. /nist-csf-20:assess # run the gap assessment via SCF crosswalk
Underneath, all three commands delegate the control-by-control mechanics to /grc-engineer:gap-assessment with SCF framework ID general-nist-csf-2-0. This plugin contributes:
- The CSF-specific scope decision tree (Functions in scope, Tier target, Community Profile selection)
- CSF-specific framing of the gap assessment output (organized by Function and Category, not by SCF family)
- Evidence patterns organized by Function → Category, covering all 106 Subcategories
For citation purposes, refer to the NIST CSF 2.0 Quick Start Guides (NIST SP 1300 series — 1300, 1301, etc., each addressing a specific audience or topic) and the public NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool. Cite by document ID and section number; do not paste their prose verbatim.
Cloud-agnostic baseline
CSF is technology-neutral. Implementation Examples are written without naming vendors. When this plugin's evidence checklist suggests artifacts (e.g., "IAM configuration export for PR.AA-01"), treat the artifact as cloud-agnostic — equivalent evidence exists in AWS IAM, Azure AD/Entra ID, GCP IAM, on-prem Active Directory, Kubernetes RBAC, or any combination. Optional vendor-specific examples may be added in a future Full-depth plugin, but Reference depth deliberately does not lock to a single cloud.
Capabilities
- CSF 2.0 scope determination (Functions in scope, Tier targeting, Community Profile selection)
- Current Profile and Target Profile authoring guidance
- Gap analysis across all six Functions and 22 Categories
- Subcategory-level evidence checklist generation
- Tier (1–4) assessment guidance for organizational risk-management practices
- Implementation Example interpretation and adaptation
- Mapping CSF Subcategories to NIST SP 800-53 / ISO 27001:2022 / CIS Controls v8 via Informative References
- Coexistence guidance with HIPAA, PCI DSS, GLBA, CMMC, NIS2, and other regulations
- Board-readable reporting structure aligned with CSF Functions
- SEC cybersecurity disclosure (Reg S-K Item 106) alignment via Govern Function
- C-SCRM (cybersecurity supply chain risk management) under GV.SC
- Multi-framework optimization via
/grc-engineer:optimize-multi-framework - SCF crosswalk navigation (general-nist-csf-2-0 → 250 SCF controls → 134 CSF Subcategories)
Levelling up to Full
A Full-depth nist-csf-20 plugin would add framework-native workflow commands tied to how CSF is actually consumed in practice. Candidates worth considering:
/nist-csf-20:profile-build— interactive Current/Target Profile authoring with Subcategory-level scoring rubric/nist-csf-20:tier-assessment— guided Tier 1–4 evaluation across the four characteristic dimensions (risk management process, integrated risk management program, external participation, supply chain risk)/nist-csf-20:community-profile— search and apply published Community Profiles (manufacturing, election infrastructure, electric grid, etc.) as a starting Target Profile/nist-csf-20:board-report— generate a Function-level executive summary suitable for board / audit committee distribution/nist-csf-20:csf1-to-csf2— migrate an existing CSF 1.1 Profile to the CSF 2.0 structure, accounting for the new Govern Function and rebalanced Categories/nist-csf-20:sec-disclosure-prep— map Govern Function outcomes to SEC Reg S-K Item 106 disclosure requirements
Contributors with practitioner experience in any of these workflows are encouraged to open a level-up PR.
Command routing
/nist-csf-20:scope— determine applicability and Profile/Tier targeting/nist-csf-20:assess— run a gap assessment via SCF crosswalk/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist— enumerate evidence per Function and Category across all 106 Subcategories
All three delegate to /grc-engineer:gap-assessment with SCF framework ID general-nist-csf-2-0 for the control-by-control mechanics, and wrap the results in CSF 2.0 vocabulary (Function / Category / Subcategory / Profile / Tier).
References
- Secure Controls Framework — crosswalk source
- SCF API entry for
general-nist-csf-2-0 - NIST CSF 2.0 (final, February 26, 2024) — published at
nist.gov/cyberframework - NIST CSF 2.0 Quick Start Guides (SP 1300 series) — audience-specific guidance from NIST
- NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool — interactive Subcategory browser with Implementation Examples and Informative References
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 3 — control catalogs cited as Informative References
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A, CIS Controls v8 — non-NIST catalogs cited as Informative References
Commands 3
NIST CSF 2.0 Assessment
Runs a Profile gap assessment against NIST Cybersecurity Framework v2.0 by delegating to /grc-engineer:gap-assessment with the framework's SCF identifier, then overlays CSF-specific framing (Function / Category / Subcategory, Current Profile vs Target Profile, Tier rationale).
Usage
/nist-csf-20:assess [--function=<GV|ID|PR|DE|RS|RC>] [--profile=<current|target|gap>] [--sources=<connector-list>]
Arguments
--function=<code>(optional) — narrow the assessment to a single Function. Codes:GV(Govern),ID(Identify),PR(Protect),DE(Detect),RS(Respond),RC(Recover). Default: all six.--profile=<phase>(optional) — which Profile phase to produce:current— Current Profile only (snapshot of present-state outcomes)target— Target Profile only (desired-state outcomes; usually informed by a Community Profile)gap(default) — both, with the delta highlighted
--sources=<connector-list>(optional) — comma-separated connector plugins (e.g.aws-inspector,github-inspector,okta-inspector).
If /nist-csf-20:scope has been run, this command will pick up the recorded Function scope, Tier targets, and Community Profile selection from that session.
What the assessment produces
- Profile snapshot — Current Profile, Target Profile, or both (per
--profile), organized by Function → Category → Subcategory. - Subcategory-level status — for each Subcategory: implemented / partially implemented / not implemented / not applicable, with evidence pointers and gap rationale.
- Function-level rollup — board-readable summary (% Subcategories meeting target, by Function).
- Tier rationale — the practitioner's assessment of organizational Tier (1–4), grounded in observed risk-management practices, not Subcategory counts.
- Evidence gaps — Subcategories where no evidence source is configured (typically Govern outcomes that depend on policy / charter documents not yet linked).
- Remediation roadmap — prioritized initiatives mapped to Subcategories, with effort and impact estimates. Pulls multi-framework optimization data when other frameworks are also being assessed.
Delegation
Under the hood:
/grc-engineer:gap-assessment "general-nist-csf-2-0" [--sources=<connector-list>]
The SCF crosswalk expands 250 SCF controls into the 134 CSF 2.0 Subcategory mappings. This command then re-organizes the SCF-family-grouped output into the CSF Function structure that practitioners and boards expect.
CSF-specific assessment notes
Most-requested scope
The most common assessment requests are:
- Full Profile (all six Functions) — annual reassessment driver. Default.
- Govern Function only — when refreshing the new (CSF 2.0) governance content, often as a discrete project after the migration from CSF 1.1.
- Detect + Respond + Recover — incident-readiness assessment, often triggered by a near-miss or a peer breach.
- Protect — technical hardening assessment, often before or after a major architecture change.
- Single Subcategory (advanced) — typically used when a regulator has flagged a specific outcome.
Sibling-framework interactions
CSF assessments are rarely run in isolation. Common combined assessments:
- CSF + NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 — federal contractors / FedRAMP workloads. CSF assessment rolls up 800-53 control evidence into Subcategory-level Profile statements.
- CSF + ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — international organizations. ISO certification work feeds CSF Subcategories via Annex A Informative References.
- CSF + HIPAA Security Rule — healthcare. CSF Profile becomes the umbrella; HIPAA Security Rule controls feed PR/DE/RS/RC Subcategories.
- CSF + PCI DSS v4.0.1 — anyone handling cardholder data. PCI DSS controls feed PR.DS, PR.AA, DE.CM Subcategories within CDE scope.
- CSF + CMMC — defense contractors. CSF Profile is a useful pre-assessment sanity check before C3PAO engagement.
- CSF + NIS2 — EU operations. CSF can serve as the internal cybersecurity management framework demonstrating NIS2-required risk-management measures.
For multi-framework optimization, see /grc-engineer:optimize-multi-framework and /grc-engineer:map-controls-unified.
Cadence
CSF imposes no mandatory cadence (it's voluntary), but a defensible practitioner cadence is:
- Annual full-Profile reassessment — aligned with fiscal year budgeting
- Quarterly Function-level review — initiative tracking, board reporting
- Triggered partial reassessment — material change (M&A, major incident, new business line, new regulation, significant supply chain shift) triggers reassessment of affected Functions
- CSF 1.1 → 2.0 migration — one-time exercise; plan around the new Govern Function and rebalanced Categories
If the assessment is feeding into a regulator's examination cycle (HIPAA risk analysis, PCI DSS ROC, NERC CIP audit, etc.), align CSF cadence with the regulator's cadence so artifacts can be reused.
Common misinterpretations to correct during assessment
- "This Subcategory is N/A because we use a SaaS vendor." Outcomes may shift to the vendor, but the outcome itself still applies; document the vendor's evidence (e.g. their SOC 2 report, their CSF Profile if they publish one) rather than marking N/A.
- "We're at Tier 4 because we have lots of tools." Tooling does not equal Tier. Tier characterizes risk-management practice rigor and adaptiveness, not technology stack depth.
- "Govern is just policy documents." Govern includes strategy, oversight, risk tolerance, RACI, and cybersecurity supply chain risk management (GV.SC). Do not collapse it to policy.
- "Implementation Examples are mandatory." They are not. Examples are non-prescriptive starting points; the Subcategory outcome is what's being assessed.
- "CSF gives us a compliance certification." It does not. There is no CSF certification. Assessment outputs are Profiles and Tier statements, not certifications.
Output formats
text(default) — full markdown gap analysis reportjson— machine-readable, suitable for downstream tooling and CI/CD gatingcsv— Subcategory-by-Subcategory matrix for spreadsheet import (common ask from boards and program managers)
Specify via --format=<text|json|csv>.
Examples
# Full Profile gap assessment (all six Functions, current vs target)
/nist-csf-20:assess
# Govern Function only — board reporting prep
/nist-csf-20:assess --function=GV
# Detect/Respond/Recover for IR readiness review
/nist-csf-20:assess --function=DE
/nist-csf-20:assess --function=RS
/nist-csf-20:assess --function=RC
# Current Profile snapshot only (no Target comparison yet)
/nist-csf-20:assess --profile=current
# Pull connector evidence
/nist-csf-20:assess --sources=aws-inspector,github-inspector,okta-inspector
Profile examples
These are illustrative Current → Target Profile snapshots for three common scenarios. Use them as a calibration reference when authoring or reviewing Profiles — not as defaults to copy verbatim, since risk tolerance and resourcing vary.
Scenario 1: Mid-market company building its first formal program
Context: 300-person SaaS company, no prior formal cybersecurity program, no mandatory regulation (not HIPAA/PCI), cyber insurance renewal driving the engagement. Tier — Current: 1 (Partial) | Tier — Target: 3 (Repeatable), 18–24 month horizon
| Function | Subcategory | Current state | Target state |
|---|---|---|---|
| GV | GV.OC-01 | Not implemented — no written cybersecurity strategy | Implemented — cybersecurity strategy approved by CEO, reviewed annually |
| GV | GV.RM-02 | Not implemented — no risk appetite statement | Implemented — board-approved risk appetite statement in place |
| GV | GV.RR-02 | Partially implemented — CISO role exists but RACI informal | Implemented — formal RACI, CISO charter, board oversight charter |
| ID | ID.AM-01 | Partially implemented — spreadsheet, not automated | Implemented — CMDB with automated discovery, reconciled quarterly |
| ID | ID.RA-01 | Not implemented — no formal vulnerability scanning | Implemented — authenticated scans monthly, critical vulns remediated within SLA |
| PR | PR.AA-03 | Partially implemented — MFA on email only | Implemented — MFA enforced on all user-facing systems and privileged access |
| PR | PR.DS-01 | Not implemented — S3 buckets unencrypted in some environments | Implemented — encryption at rest enforced by policy across all storage |
| DE | DE.CM-01 | Not implemented — no centralized logging | Implemented — SIEM ingesting all critical log sources, 90-day retention |
| RS | RS.MA-01 | Not implemented — no written IR plan | Implemented — IR plan written, tabletop exercised annually |
| RC | RC.RP-01 | Not implemented — no BCDR plan | Implemented — BCDR plan tested, RTO/RPO defined and met in last test |
Quick wins (high ROI, low effort): GV.PO-01 (write policies), PR.AA-03 (expand MFA), ID.AM-01 (automate asset inventory), RS.MA-01 (document IR plan).
Scenario 2: Federal contractor preparing for a CSF-aligned solicitation
Context: 1,200-person defense services firm, existing NIST SP 800-171 / CMMC Level 2 work underway. A new civilian agency contract requires a CSF Profile submission. Tier — Current: 2 (Risk Informed) | Tier — Target: 3 (Repeatable), aligned with existing CMMC timeline
| Function | Subcategory | Current state | Target state |
|---|---|---|---|
| GV | GV.OC-03 | Implemented — regulatory register maintained (DFARS, CMMC, FAR) | Implemented — expand to cover new civilian agency requirements |
| GV | GV.SC-04 | Partially implemented — critical subcontractors identified informally | Implemented — tiered supplier inventory with criticality scores, reviewed annually |
| GV | GV.SC-07 | Not implemented — no ongoing vendor risk monitoring cadence | Implemented — annual supplier reassessment for Tier 1 vendors, quarterly for critical |
| ID | ID.RA-09 | Partially implemented — software SCA in CI/CD, hardware not covered | Implemented — hardware provenance checks in procurement; SBOM produced for all deliverables |
| PR | PR.AA-05 | Implemented — RBAC defined in 800-171 SSP | Implemented — reuse 800-171 evidence wholesale via Informative Reference |
| PR | PR.PS-06 | Partially implemented — SAST in pipeline, no DAST | Implemented — SAST + DAST in CI/CD, results reviewed before release |
| DE | DE.CM-09 | Implemented — EDR deployed on all endpoints | Implemented — extend to cover OT/ICS assets in scope |
| RS | RS.AN-07 | Not implemented — no formal forensic evidence handling procedure | Implemented — forensic evidence collection procedure with chain-of-custody records and integrity hashing in place |
Note: Most 800-53 Rev. 5 control evidence maps directly to CSF Subcategories via Informative References. Reuse existing SSP and POA&M artifacts; avoid re-collecting evidence already gathered for 800-171/CMMC work.
Scenario 3: Healthcare organization using CSF as the umbrella above HIPAA
Context: Regional health system, 4,500 employees, subject to HIPAA Security Rule. Using CSF to give the board a single-page cybersecurity view and to structure the annual HIPAA Security Risk Analysis. Tier — Current: 2 (Risk Informed) | Tier — Target: 3 (Repeatable), driven by HHS OCR audit preparation
| Function | Subcategory | Current state | Target state | HIPAA mapping |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GV | GV.OC-03 | Implemented — HIPAA regulatory register maintained | Implemented — expand to cover state breach notification laws and 42 CFR Part 2 | 45 CFR §164.306 |
| GV | GV.RM-01 | Partially implemented — risk analysis done, but not tied to formal risk appetite | Implemented — risk appetite statement board-approved, SRA output feeds risk register | 45 CFR §164.308(a)(1) |
| ID | ID.RA-01 | Implemented — vulnerability scans quarterly on ePHI systems | Implemented — extend to medical devices and OT systems | 45 CFR §164.308(a)(1) |
| ID | ID.AM-03 | Partially implemented — data flows documented for primary EHR, not all integrations | Implemented — full ePHI data flow map updated annually and on architecture change | 45 CFR §164.308(a)(1) |
| PR | PR.DS-01 | Partially implemented — EHR encrypted; medical devices and PACS not consistently | Implemented — encryption enforced or compensating controls documented for all ePHI at rest | 45 CFR §164.312(a)(2)(iv) |
| PR | PR.AT-01 | Implemented — annual HIPAA training | Implemented — role-based training for clinical, administrative, and IT staff | 45 CFR §164.308(a)(5) |
| DE | DE.CM-03 | Partially implemented — audit logging on EHR, no UEBA | Implemented — UEBA or equivalent anomalous-access detection on all ePHI systems | 45 CFR §164.312(b) |
| RS | RS.CO-02 | Implemented — breach notification process for HHS/OCR | Implemented — expand to cover state AG notifications and media where required | 45 CFR §§164.404–410 |
Reuse guidance: HIPAA Security Rule audit evidence (risk analyses, training records, BAAs, access logs, encryption configurations) counts directly as CSF evidence for the corresponding Subcategories. Do not collect twice.
Related commands
/nist-csf-20:scope— define Profile scope, Tier target, sector overlays before assessment/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist— enumerate evidence per Function before / during assessment/grc-engineer:gap-assessment general-nist-csf-2-0— direct SCF-crosswalk-driven assessment/grc-engineer:optimize-multi-framework— when CSF is being assessed alongside multiple frameworks
Framework: NIST Cybersecurity Framework v2.0 (final, February 26, 2024)
SCF ID: general-nist-csf-2-0
Status: Voluntary; widely adopted as a U.S. and international cybersecurity baseline
NIST CSF 2.0 Evidence Checklist
Baseline evidence checklist for a NIST Cybersecurity Framework v2.0 Profile assessment. CSF is outcomes-based, not control-based — evidence demonstrates that an outcome (a Subcategory) is achieved, regardless of how. This checklist is organized by the six Functions and covers all 106 official Subcategories with the artifacts an assessor or board reviewer typically expects to see.
Never commit evidence artifacts to source control. Configuration exports, access logs, and incident records frequently contain sensitive operational detail. Use an encrypted, access-controlled evidence locker. The repo's default
.gitignoreshould already coverevidence/.
Usage
/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist [--function=<GV|ID|PR|DE|RS|RC>] [--format=table|markdown|csv]
Arguments
--function=<code>(optional) — restrict to a single Function. Codes:GV,ID,PR,DE,RS,RC. Default: all six.--format=<fmt>(optional) —table(default Markdown table),markdown(detailed list),csv(spreadsheet import).--family=<SCF_family_code>(optional, advanced) — restrict to a single SCF family (e.g.IAC,CRY,AST,BCD). Most users should use--functioninstead; use--familyonly when reusing evidence collection scripts written against the SCF crosswalk.
How CSF evidence works
CSF Subcategory outcomes can be evidenced in many ways. The same outcome may be supported by:
- A policy document (Govern outcomes especially)
- A configuration export (Protect, Detect)
- A log sample (Detect, Respond)
- A ticket / runbook (Respond, Recover)
- A training completion record (Protect)
- A board minute or risk register entry (Govern)
Reference-depth practitioners should accept multiple forms of evidence per Subcategory and avoid demanding a specific format unless the assessment driver (e.g. a federal contract or a sector regulator) imposes one.
Evidence by Function
Govern (GV) — strategy, policy, oversight, supply chain
Govern is the new 2.0 Function and the one boards care most about. Govern evidence is mostly document + sign-off, not technical config exports.
GV.OC — Organizational Context
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence the assessor / board expects |
|---|---|---|
| GV.OC-01 — organizational mission informs cybersecurity risk management | Cybersecurity strategy tied to the organization's mission | Cybersecurity strategy document referencing mission; board / executive sign-off |
| GV.OC-02 — internal and external stakeholders' needs and expectations understood | Stakeholder map covering internal teams, regulators, customers, and partners | Stakeholder register; engagement records; CISO / board communication logs showing stakeholder inputs considered |
| GV.OC-03 — legal, regulatory, and contractual cybersecurity requirements identified and managed | Catalog of regulatory obligations (HIPAA, PCI DSS, GLBA, state breach laws, sector regulators) | Regulatory inventory / register; ownership map; review cadence record |
| GV.OC-04 — critical services and capabilities external stakeholders depend on are understood | Service dependency map communicated to leadership and relevant teams | Service dependency documentation; customer / partner SLA register; critical service inventory |
| GV.OC-05 — outcomes and services the organization depends on from others are understood | Inventory of third-party dependencies including cloud, SaaS, and critical vendors | Third-party dependency register; critical vendor inventory; single-point-of-failure analysis |
GV.RM — Risk Management Strategy
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| GV.RM-01 — risk management objectives established and agreed to by stakeholders | Documented and approved risk management objectives | Approved risk management objectives document; stakeholder sign-off records |
| GV.RM-02 — risk appetite and risk tolerance statements established, communicated, and maintained | Formal risk appetite and tolerance statements | Approved risk appetite / tolerance statement; board or executive approval record; evidence of communication to relevant teams |
| GV.RM-03 — cybersecurity risk integrated into enterprise risk management | Cyber risk entries in the enterprise risk register | ERM process documentation showing cyber integration; integrated risk register with cyber entries; ERM committee minutes including cyber items |
| GV.RM-04 — strategic direction for risk response options established and communicated | Documented framework for choosing among risk response options (accept / transfer / mitigate / avoid) | Risk response strategy or decision framework document; communication records to responsible parties |
| GV.RM-05 — lines of communication for cybersecurity risks established across the organization | Escalation and communication paths for cyber risk, including third-party risks | Cybersecurity risk escalation matrix; supplier risk communication workflow; CISO reporting cadence to board documentation |
| GV.RM-06 — standardized method for calculating, documenting, categorizing, and prioritizing cybersecurity risks established | Documented risk scoring or quantification methodology | Risk methodology document; calibration or validation records; sample risk register entries demonstrating methodology applied consistently |
| GV.RM-07 — strategic opportunities (positive risks) characterized and included in risk discussions | Evidence that upside / opportunity risks are considered alongside threats | Risk committee or board minutes showing positive risks discussed; opportunity register or positive risk entries in risk register |
GV.RR — Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| GV.RR-01 — leadership accountable for cybersecurity risk and fosters a risk-aware culture | Formal accountability at the board and executive level; visible tone-at-the-top for cybersecurity | Board / executive accountability statement; CISO charter; board cybersecurity committee charter; leadership messaging on security culture |
| GV.RR-02 — roles, responsibilities, and authorities for cybersecurity established, communicated, and enforced | RACI for cybersecurity decisions at program and operational level | Cybersecurity RACI / org chart; CISO charter; board cybersecurity oversight charter |
| GV.RR-03 — adequate resources allocated commensurate with cybersecurity risk strategy | Cybersecurity budget and staffing aligned to risk posture and strategic priorities | Budget approval records showing cybersecurity allocation; headcount and tooling plans; resource sufficiency review tied to risk appetite |
| GV.RR-04 — cybersecurity included in human resources practices | HR lifecycle processes (hiring, onboarding, offboarding) incorporate cybersecurity requirements | HR policy referencing cybersecurity requirements; background check records; onboarding security training completion evidence; offboarding access revocation process documentation |
GV.PO — Policy
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| GV.PO-01 — policies for managing cybersecurity risks established, communicated, and enforced | Written, approved cybersecurity policies covering the full risk management scope | Policy library with version control, approval signatures, and review history |
| GV.PO-02 — cybersecurity risk policies reviewed, updated, and enforced to reflect changes | Evidence policies are refreshed in response to threats, technology, and organizational changes | Policy revision history; scheduled review records; change log showing updates triggered by new threats or regulatory changes; communication records for policy updates |
GV.OV — Oversight
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| GV.OV-01 — cybersecurity strategy results reviewed to inform and adjust direction | Board or audit committee receives and acts on cybersecurity strategy performance data | Board cybersecurity reporting deck; audit committee minutes; independent review or assurance report |
| GV.OV-02 — cybersecurity risk management strategy reviewed and adjusted to ensure coverage | Evidence that strategy is revisited when requirements or risk landscape changes | Strategy review meeting minutes; updated strategy documents; records of adjustments made in response to new risks, incidents, or regulatory changes |
| GV.OV-03 — cybersecurity risk management performance evaluated and reviewed | KPIs, metrics, or program health reviews used to assess and improve performance | KPI / metric dashboard; executive or board performance review records; program effectiveness reports; benchmark comparisons or third-party assessments |
GV.SC — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| GV.SC-01 — cybersecurity supply chain risk management program established | C-SCRM program with documented strategy, objectives, policies, and processes | Vendor risk management policy; tiered vendor inventory; due diligence templates |
| GV.SC-02 — cybersecurity roles for suppliers, customers, and partners established and coordinated | Clear accountability for supply chain cybersecurity internally and with third parties | Vendor RACI; third-party cybersecurity responsibility matrix; partner agreements referencing security roles and coordination |
| GV.SC-03 — C-SCRM integrated into enterprise risk management and improvement processes | Supply chain risks visible in ERM and feeding continuous improvement cycles | Process documentation showing C-SCRM feeds into ERM; integrated risk register with supply chain entries; evidence of supply chain risk inputs to improvement activities |
| GV.SC-04 — suppliers known and prioritized by criticality | Tiered vendor inventory with criticality rationale | Tiered vendor inventory; criticality scoring criteria and methodology; critical vendor shortlist with documented rationale |
| GV.SC-05 — supply chain cybersecurity requirements addressed in contracts | Standard cybersecurity contract clauses in supplier agreements | Standard cybersecurity contract clauses; sample executed vendor agreements referencing security requirements |
| GV.SC-06 — planning and due diligence performed before entering new supplier relationships | Pre-engagement vetting process for new vendors | Pre-engagement vendor assessment checklist; due diligence questionnaires and vendor responses; approval records for new vendor relationships |
| GV.SC-07 — risks from suppliers monitored throughout the relationship | Ongoing vendor risk monitoring and re-assessment cadence | Ongoing vendor risk monitoring schedule; periodic vendor assessment records; risk re-evaluation trigger criteria and evidence of application |
| GV.SC-08 — suppliers included in incident planning, response, and recovery | Third parties incorporated into IR exercises and response activities | IR plan sections referencing key third-party suppliers; tabletop exercise records involving critical vendors; vendor IR contact list and notification procedures |
| GV.SC-09 — supply chain security practices integrated and monitored through the product/service life cycle | SCRM embedded across the full technology acquisition and management lifecycle | SCRM lifecycle process documentation; component integrity verification records; hardware / software provenance tracking evidence |
| GV.SC-10 — C-SCRM plans include provisions for end-of-partnership activities | Offboarding and wind-down security steps covered in contracts and internal processes | Contract offboarding / termination clauses referencing security; end-of-relationship security checklist; access revocation and data return / destruction records post-contract |
Identify (ID) — context, assets, risk assessment, improvement
Identify evidence is mostly inventories and assessments.
ID.AM — Asset Management
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| ID.AM-01 — hardware inventory maintained | Asset inventory of physical devices | Asset inventory export (CMDB / IT asset management tool); reconciliation cadence record |
| ID.AM-02 — software, services, and systems inventory maintained | Software and services asset management | Software asset management export; SBOM (software bill of materials) where applicable |
| ID.AM-03 — authorized network communication and data flows documented | Data flow diagrams and network communication maps | Data flow diagrams; data classification register; data lineage documentation |
| ID.AM-04 — inventories of services provided by suppliers maintained | Catalog of third-party and cloud services in use | Supplier service catalog; SaaS / IaaS / PaaS inventory; contract register tied to service inventory |
| ID.AM-05 — assets prioritized based on classification, criticality, resources, and impact on the mission | Asset criticality / classification scheme applied and maintained | Asset classification scheme; tier or criticality assignment per system; review record |
| ID.AM-07 — inventories of data and metadata maintained for designated data types | Data inventory and classification records | Data inventory / register; data classification records; metadata tagging evidence; data map |
| ID.AM-08 — assets managed throughout their life cycles | Asset lifecycle management covering acquisition through decommission | Asset lifecycle policy; decommission and disposal records; end-of-life hardware / software disposition evidence (certificate of destruction where applicable) |
ID.RA — Risk Assessment
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| ID.RA-01 — vulnerabilities in assets identified, validated, and recorded | Vulnerability management process and outputs | Vulnerability scan reports; remediation ticket samples; SLA / process documentation |
| ID.RA-02 — cyber threat intelligence received from information sharing forums and sources | Active participation in threat intelligence sharing | Threat intel feed subscriptions (ISAC membership, government feeds such as CISA); threat reports received; threat intel integration or processing logs |
| ID.RA-03 — internal and external threats identified and recorded | Threat catalog or threat model maintained | Threat catalogue or threat modeling outputs; threat identification records in risk register; threat landscape review documentation |
| ID.RA-04 — potential impacts and likelihoods of threats exploiting vulnerabilities identified | Likelihood and impact analysis for identified risks | Risk assessment methodology outputs with likelihood / impact scoring; risk heat maps or risk matrices |
| ID.RA-05 — threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts used to inform risk response prioritization | Risk assessment drives prioritized response | Risk assessment report; risk register with prioritization rationale; methodology documentation (often NIST SP 800-30 aligned) |
| ID.RA-06 — risk responses chosen, prioritized, planned, tracked, and communicated | Risk treatment decisions documented and tracked through to completion | Risk treatment decisions in risk register; remediation plans and status reports; stakeholder communication records on risk response |
| ID.RA-07 — changes and exceptions managed, assessed for risk impact, recorded, and tracked | Change management and exception processes include risk assessment step | Change management records showing risk review; exception request logs with risk assessments; tracking records for open exceptions |
| ID.RA-08 — processes for receiving, analyzing, and responding to vulnerability disclosures established | Vulnerability disclosure or responsible disclosure program | Vulnerability disclosure policy (VDP) or responsible disclosure process documentation; bug bounty program documentation (if applicable); disclosure intake and response records |
| ID.RA-09 — authenticity and integrity of hardware and software assessed before acquisition and use | Supply chain integrity checks in procurement | Procurement security requirements; software composition analysis (SCA) results; hardware provenance checks; signing / verification records |
| ID.RA-10 — critical suppliers assessed before acquisition | Security vetting of critical vendors prior to onboarding | Pre-acquisition vendor security assessment records; supplier vetting questionnaire responses; risk rating documentation for critical suppliers |
ID.IM — Improvement
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| ID.IM-01 — improvements identified from evaluations | Formal evaluations feed a documented improvement process | Post-assessment review reports; security program review minutes; improvement backlog or tracking record |
| ID.IM-02 — improvements identified from security tests and exercises | Penetration tests, red team exercises, and tabletop exercises yield tracked improvements | Penetration test reports; red team or tabletop exercise after-action reports; improvement items with owner and target date |
| ID.IM-03 — improvements identified from execution of operational processes, procedures, and activities | Lessons learned from operational reviews integrated into the improvement cycle | Operational review improvement logs; process performance review records; recurring finding tracking across monitoring cycles |
| ID.IM-04 — incident response plans and other cybersecurity plans that affect operations are established, communicated, maintained, and improved | Cybersecurity plans beyond the IR plan are kept current and shared with relevant parties | IR plan with version history and communication records; business continuity / BCDR plan; sector-specific operational plans; improvement records from exercises and post-incident reviews |
Protect (PR) — identity, training, data, platform, infrastructure
Protect evidence is the largest bucket and is mostly technical configuration plus operational records.
PR.AA — Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| PR.AA-01 — identities and credentials managed by the organization | Identity and access management baseline | IAM configuration export (cloud IdP / Active Directory / Entra / Okta); user provisioning workflow documentation |
| PR.AA-02 — identities proofed and bound to credentials based on context of interactions | Identity proofing process matched to risk level of the interaction | Identity proofing process documentation; credential issuance records; identity verification audit log samples |
| PR.AA-03 — users, services, and hardware authenticated commensurate with risk | Authentication strength appropriate to the sensitivity of resources | MFA enrollment / enforcement reports; authentication policy; service-account inventory |
| PR.AA-04 — identity assertions protected, conveyed, and verified | Federation and single sign-on security controls in place | SAML / OIDC / OAuth configuration evidence; federation trust records; token validation logs; SSO assertion integrity controls documentation |
| PR.AA-05 — access permissions managed per least privilege and separation of duties | Role-based access and SoD controls defined, enforced, and reviewed | RBAC role definitions; access review records; SoD conflict matrix |
| PR.AA-06 — physical access to assets managed, monitored, and enforced commensurate with risk | Physical access controls for facilities, data centers, and sensitive areas | Physical access control system configuration; badge access logs; visitor logs; data center physical security audit or inspection records |
PR.AT — Awareness and Training
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| PR.AT-01 — personnel provided with security awareness and training | Security awareness training program for all staff | Training completion reports; training content / curriculum; phishing simulation results |
| PR.AT-02 — individuals in specialized roles provided with role-specific training | Targeted training for security, development, IR, and other roles with elevated risk | Role-specific security training completion records; CISO, developer, and IR team training evidence; relevant certifications held |
PR.DS — Data Security
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| PR.DS-01 — data-at-rest protected | Encryption at rest across storage and databases | Encryption configuration evidence (KMS keys, storage encryption settings); key rotation records |
| PR.DS-02 — data-in-transit protected | Encryption in transit across all communication channels | TLS configuration evidence; cert inventory; mTLS / VPN configuration where applicable |
| PR.DS-10 — data-in-use protected | Controls protecting data during active processing | Hash / signature verification logs; tamper-evident logging; memory protection or secure enclave configuration where applicable |
| PR.DS-11 — backups created, protected, maintained, and tested | Backup program covering creation, integrity, protection, and periodic restoration testing | Backup policy; backup completion logs; restoration test records; offsite or cloud backup configuration; backup access control evidence |
PR.PS — Platform Security
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| PR.PS-01 — configuration baselines maintained | System hardening baselines applied and monitored | CIS Benchmark scan reports; STIG compliance reports; configuration management tool (Puppet / Chef / Ansible / Terraform) state |
| PR.PS-02 — software maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk | Patch management and software lifecycle discipline | Patch management records; software EOL tracking; decommission logs; unsupported software inventory with exception approvals |
| PR.PS-03 — hardware maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk | Hardware refresh and disposal process | Hardware EOL / refresh schedule; decommission records; hardware disposal records with certificate of destruction where required |
| PR.PS-04 — log records generated and made available for continuous monitoring | Logging coverage across systems and services with logs fed to monitoring tooling | Logging architecture diagram; log source inventory; SIEM ingestion proof |
| PR.PS-05 — unauthorized software installation and execution prevented | Application control or allowlisting enforced | Application allowlisting configuration; EDR block records; software restriction policy documentation |
| PR.PS-06 — secure software development practices integrated | Secure SDLC with security gates | SAST / DAST scan results; code review records; security gates in CI/CD pipeline |
PR.IR — Technology Infrastructure Resilience
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| PR.IR-01 — networks and environments protected from unauthorized logical access | Network segmentation and perimeter security controls | Network architecture diagrams; security group / firewall rule exports; segmentation test results |
| PR.IR-02 — technology assets protected from environmental threats | Environmental controls protecting physical infrastructure | Environmental controls evidence (HVAC, fire suppression, flood protection); data center environmental audit records; UPS / power redundancy configuration |
| PR.IR-03 — mechanisms implemented to achieve resilience in normal and adverse situations | Failover, redundancy, and DR capabilities tested and validated | Resilience architecture documentation; failover and DR test results; high-availability configuration evidence |
| PR.IR-04 — adequate resource capacity maintained for availability | Capacity planning and auto-scaling in place | Capacity planning documents; load test results; auto-scaling configuration |
Detect (DE) — continuous monitoring, adverse event analysis
Detect evidence is mostly monitoring config + log samples + alert records.
DE.CM — Continuous Monitoring
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| DE.CM-01 — networks and network services monitored for adverse events | Network monitoring and intrusion detection | SIEM dashboard screenshots / exports; NDR / IDS configuration; sample alerts |
| DE.CM-02 — physical environment monitored for adverse events | Physical security monitoring of facilities | Physical security monitoring logs; CCTV configuration; environmental sensor alerts; physical access anomaly reports |
| DE.CM-03 — personnel activity and technology usage monitored for adverse events | User and entity behavior analytics or insider threat detection | UEBA tool configuration; sample anomalous-activity alerts; data access monitoring configuration |
| DE.CM-06 — external service provider activities and services monitored | Third-party access and activity monitoring | Vendor access audit logs; CASB configuration; sample alerts on third-party anomalous activity |
| DE.CM-09 — computing hardware, software, runtime environments, and their data are monitored | Endpoint and runtime environment monitoring for anomalies | EDR configuration; runtime monitoring tool configuration; sample drift or anomaly alerts |
DE.AE — Adverse Event Analysis
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| DE.AE-02 — potentially adverse events analyzed to better understand associated activities | Event triage and analysis capability | SOC playbooks; analyst notes / case management records; sample triaged events |
| DE.AE-03 — information correlated from multiple sources | Multi-source log correlation and enrichment | SIEM correlation rule examples; log aggregation architecture diagram; sample multi-source correlated alerts |
| DE.AE-04 — estimated impact and scope of adverse events understood | Impact and scope analysis integrated into triage | Incident severity scoring rubric; sample severity assignments; escalation criteria documentation |
| DE.AE-06 — information on adverse events provided to authorized staff and tools | Alert routing to the right people and downstream tooling | Alert routing rules; on-call / paging configuration; escalation matrix |
| DE.AE-07 — cyber threat intelligence integrated into adverse event analysis | Threat intel enriching alerts and investigations | Threat intel platform (TIP) integration records; enriched alert samples; STIX / TAXII feed configuration |
| DE.AE-08 — incidents declared when adverse events meet defined criteria | Formal incident declaration process with documented thresholds | Incident declaration criteria / severity thresholds; sample incident declarations; escalation workflow records |
Respond (RS) — incident management, analysis, communication, mitigation
Respond evidence is mostly incident records, runbooks, and after-action reports.
RS.MA — Incident Management
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| RS.MA-01 — incident response plan executed in coordination with relevant third parties | IR plan in active use during incidents | Incident response plan; sample incident records; tabletop exercise reports |
| RS.MA-02 — incident reports triaged and validated | Initial triage process to validate and assess incoming incident reports | Triage workflow documentation; sample triage records showing validation steps; runbook for initial incident intake |
| RS.MA-03 — incidents categorized and prioritized | Classification and prioritization scheme applied consistently | Severity / category taxonomy; sample categorized and prioritized incident records |
| RS.MA-04 — incidents escalated or elevated as needed | Escalation thresholds and paths defined and followed | Escalation policy / thresholds; sample escalation records; on-call / escalation matrix |
| RS.MA-05 — criteria for initiating incident recovery applied | Defined and applied criteria for transitioning from response to recovery | Recovery initiation criteria documentation; sample decisions to initiate recovery with rationale; IR plan section defining recovery triggers |
RS.AN — Incident Analysis
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| RS.AN-03 — analysis performed to establish what occurred and root cause of incident | Forensic and root cause analysis capability | Forensic analysis reports; chain-of-custody logs where applicable; root cause analysis (RCA) documentation |
| RS.AN-06 — investigation actions recorded with integrity and provenance preserved | Tamper-evident investigation audit trail | Investigation log with integrity controls; chain-of-custody records; forensic tool audit trails showing actions taken |
| RS.AN-07 — incident data and metadata are collected, and their integrity and provenance are preserved | Evidence handling practices maintain chain of custody and integrity throughout the investigation | Forensic evidence collection procedures; chain-of-custody records; integrity hash / signing evidence; evidence storage access logs |
| RS.AN-08 — an incident's magnitude is estimated and validated | Scope and impact quantification performed and validated during incident response | Incident scope assessment records; magnitude / impact estimates with validation notes; escalation decisions tied to magnitude assessments |
RS.CO — Incident Response Reporting and Communication
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| RS.CO-02 — internal and external stakeholders notified of incidents in a timely manner | Stakeholder notification process and records | Communication plan; sample notification records (internal and external); regulator notification samples (HHS OCR, state AGs, etc., where applicable) |
| RS.CO-03 — information shared with designated internal and external stakeholders | Cross-functional and external coordination | Sample executive briefings; sample post-incident customer notifications; coordinated disclosure records |
RS.MI — Incident Mitigation
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| RS.MI-01 — incidents contained | Containment actions taken and documented | Sample containment actions; containment runbook; quarantine / isolation evidence |
| RS.MI-02 — incidents eradicated | Eradication actions taken and documented | Eradication runbooks; sample eradication action records (malware removal, account disablement, etc.) |
Recover (RC) — recovery plan execution, recovery communication
Recover evidence is mostly BCDR plans, test reports, and recovery records.
RC.RP — Incident Recovery Plan Execution
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| RC.RP-01 — recovery portion of incident response plan executed | Recovery plan in active use | BCDR plan; sample recovery records; recovery time achieved vs. RTO |
| RC.RP-02 — recovery actions selected, scoped, prioritized, and performed | Recovery prioritization decisions documented and carried through to execution | Recovery priority ranking; sample prioritization decisions made during exercises or actual incidents; recovery task completion records |
| RC.RP-03 — integrity of backups and restoration assets verified before use | Backup integrity validation before restoring | Backup verification logs; sample restoration tests; integrity check evidence |
| RC.RP-04 — critical mission functions considered to establish post-incident operational norms | Return-to-operations criteria defined and applied | Post-incident operating model; sample reset-state documentation; criteria for declaring stabilized operations |
| RC.RP-05 — integrity of restored assets verified and normal operating status confirmed | Post-restoration validation and sign-off | Restoration verification checklist; system health check records; sign-off records confirming normal operations resumed |
| RC.RP-06 — end of incident recovery declared and incident-related documentation completed | Formal recovery closeout process | Sample closeout records; lessons-learned reports; incident closure approvals |
RC.CO — Incident Recovery Communication
| Subcategory | What it asks for | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| RC.CO-03 — recovery activities and progress communicated to designated stakeholders | Internal and external recovery status updates | Sample recovery status updates; executive / customer / regulator communication records |
| RC.CO-04 — public updates on incident recovery shared using approved methods and messaging | Controlled public communications during and after recovery | Public communications log; approved messaging templates; records of communications with media, customers, or regulators using approved channels |
Reusing evidence across frameworks
CSF evidence is highly reusable. If the organization is also subject to:
- HIPAA Security Rule — most PR and DE evidence (encryption configs, audit logs, training records, BAAs) doubles as HIPAA evidence
- PCI DSS v4.0.1 — PR.AA, PR.DS, DE.CM evidence covers most of the PCI technical requirements within CDE scope
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 — direct mapping via Informative References; reuse 800-53 control evidence wholesale
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — Annex A controls map to CSF Subcategories; reuse ISO ISMS evidence
- GLBA Safeguards Rule — Govern + Identify + Protect evidence covers most of the Safeguards Rule's written-program requirements
- SOX ITGC — PR.AA (access control), PR.PS-01 (configuration baselines), DE.CM (monitoring) feed ITGC testing
Use /grc-engineer:optimize-multi-framework to plan evidence collection that satisfies multiple frameworks at once. Avoid duplicating collection effort.
Retention
CSF imposes no specific retention period. In practice, retain evidence for at least:
- 3 years for general CSF Profile assessment artifacts (most cyber insurance carriers and federal contracting officers expect this)
- 6 years if the same evidence supports HIPAA Security Rule (45 CFR §164.316(b)(2))
- As specified by sector regulator if the evidence is reused for FERC/NERC, FFIEC, PCI DSS, etc. — those regulators' retention requirements govern.
- As specified by state law for breach-related evidence — varies by state; conservative default is 7 years.
Examples
# Full evidence checklist (all six Functions)
/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist
# Govern Function evidence only — useful for board reporting prep
/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist --function=GV
# Detect + Respond + Recover for an IR readiness engagement
/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist --function=DE
/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist --function=RS
/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist --function=RC
# CSV export for spreadsheet-driven evidence tracking
/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist --format=csv
Related commands
/nist-csf-20:scope— define Profile / Tier / Function scope before collecting evidence/nist-csf-20:assess— gap-assess the collected evidence against the Target Profile/grc-engineer:gap-assessment general-nist-csf-2-0— direct SCF-crosswalk-driven assessment
Framework: NIST Cybersecurity Framework v2.0 (final, February 26, 2024)
SCF ID: general-nist-csf-2-0
Status: Voluntary; widely adopted as a U.S. and international cybersecurity baseline
NIST CSF 2.0 Scope
Determines how NIST Cybersecurity Framework v2.0 should be applied to the organization. CSF is voluntary and cross-sector — there is no "in scope vs out of scope" determination in the regulatory sense. Instead, this command answers the practitioner questions: which Functions, which Profile target, which Tier target, which sector overlay?
Usage
/nist-csf-20:scope
What this produces
- Applicability rationale — why the organization is using CSF (federal contract, sector regulator alignment, board reporting, internal management), and what that implies for breadth/depth
- Functions in scope — typically all six (GV, ID, PR, DE, RS, RC), but a Profile may legitimately defer some Subcategories
- Tier target — Tier 1, 2, 3, or 4, with rationale grounded in risk tolerance and resourcing
- Profile starting point — build from scratch, adapt a published Community Profile, or migrate from an existing CSF 1.1 Profile
- Sector overlays — which sector regulator(s) the CSF Profile must support (HIPAA, GLBA, PCI DSS, NERC CIP, FFIEC, TSA, etc.)
- Next steps — whether to proceed with
/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist(collection) or/nist-csf-20:assess(gap analysis)
Pre-scope questions
Before producing scope output, confirm with the user:
1. Why is the organization using CSF?
Pick the primary driver (multiple may apply, but one usually dominates):
- Federal contract requirement — solicitation explicitly references CSF or asks for a Profile
- Sector regulator alignment — CSF Profile feeds into HIPAA, GLBA, PCI DSS, NERC CIP, FFIEC, TSA, or similar examinations
- EO 14028 / critical infrastructure — operator of critical infrastructure adopting the U.S. national cybersecurity baseline
- SEC cybersecurity disclosure — public company structuring its Reg S-K Item 106 disclosures around CSF Functions
- Cyber insurance — carrier requesting CSF Profile / Tier as part of underwriting
- Board / audit committee reporting — CISO needs a stable communication framework for governance reporting
- Internal program management — first formal cybersecurity program, building from CSF as the structure
- State affirmative-defense statute — qualifying for a state safe-harbor in breach litigation (Connecticut, Ohio, Utah, others)
- CSF 1.1 → 2.0 migration — existing CSF 1.1 Profile being upgraded to CSF 2.0
The driver determines the level of evidence rigor and the cadence of reassessment.
2. Which version is in play?
- CSF 2.0 (this plugin) — published February 26, 2024
- CSF 1.1 — superseded but still referenced by some contracts and regulators
If existing artifacts reference 1.1, plan a migration. The Govern (GV) Function is new in 2.0; many ID Subcategories from 1.1 (especially supply chain) moved into GV.SC.
3. What sector(s) is the organization in?
CSF is cross-sector, but several Community Profiles exist for specific sectors. Using a Community Profile as the starting Target Profile is faster and more defensible than building from scratch. Confirm whether one applies:
- Manufacturing (CSF Manufacturing Profile)
- Election infrastructure
- Electric grid / energy sector
- Healthcare
- Telecommunications
- Federal civilian (alongside SP 800-53)
- Smart Grid / OT
- Other published Community Profiles — check the NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool
4. What other frameworks does the organization already comply with?
This dictates what evidence is reusable. Common combinations:
- HIPAA Security Rule — most ePHI controls roll up under PR.DS, PR.AA, DE.CM, RS.MA, RC.RP
- PCI DSS v4.0.1 — cardholder data controls roll up under PR.DS, PR.AA, DE.CM
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 — direct Informative Reference; FedRAMP / federal systems
- NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 3 / CMMC — DIB / CUI
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — international ISMS; Annex A is an Informative Reference
- CIS Controls v8 — community catalog; Informative Reference
- GLBA Safeguards Rule — financial institutions
- SOX ITGCs — public-company financial-reporting IT controls
Reuse evidence; do not collect twice.
5. What's the Tier target?
Refer the user to the SKILL's Tier section. Anchors:
- Tier 1 (Partial) — startup with limited cybersecurity capability; CSF being adopted as the structure for building a first program
- Tier 2 (Risk Informed) — established cybersecurity practices, but not consistently policy-backed or organization-wide. Common starting point for mid-market.
- Tier 3 (Repeatable) — formalized policies, consistent application, integrated supply chain risk management. Common target for regulated mid-market and large enterprise.
- Tier 4 (Adaptive) — risk management adapts based on lessons learned and predictive indicators; cybersecurity culturally integrated. High-resource organizations with high risk exposure.
A reasonable default for an organization in the "we should formalize this" stage is Current Tier 1, Target Tier 3, achievable over 18–24 months — but the right answer is whatever reflects the organization's actual risk tolerance and resourcing.
6. Which Functions are in scope?
The default is all six (GV, ID, PR, DE, RS, RC). Legitimate reasons to narrow:
- Pure design / architecture engagement → GV + ID + PR (defer DE/RS/RC if they're handled by a separate operations team)
- Incident readiness engagement → DE + RS + RC (assume GV/ID/PR baseline established)
- Governance refresh → GV alone (the new 2.0 Function), often done as a discrete project
Document the rationale; partial Function scope tends to surface during board reporting and is worth defending in writing.
Output format
After collecting the answers above, produce a scope memo with:
NIST CSF 2.0 Scope — <Organization Name>
Driver: <primary driver>
CSF version: 2.0 (migrating from 1.1: yes/no)
Sector(s): <sectors>
Community Profile: <selected Community Profile or "build from scratch">
Functions in scope: GV, ID, PR, DE, RS, RC (or narrowed list with rationale)
Tier — current: <T1 / T2 / T3 / T4>
Tier — target: <T1 / T2 / T3 / T4>
Reassessment cadence: annual / quarterly / triggered-only
Coexisting frameworks: <HIPAA / PCI DSS / 800-53 / ISO 27001 / etc>
Sector regulator overlays: <FERC/NERC, HHS/HPH, FFIEC, TSA, etc>
Next steps: /nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist → /nist-csf-20:assess
What this command does NOT do
- It does not impose Functions or Tiers — those are organizational decisions informed by risk tolerance and resourcing.
- It does not certify the organization as "CSF compliant" — there is no CSF certification (see SKILL: Common misinterpretations).
- It does not enumerate every Subcategory — that's
/nist-csf-20:assess(control-by-control gap) and/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist(per-Function evidence patterns). - It does not replace sector-regulator scoping (HIPAA, PCI DSS, etc.). If the organization is regulated, run the regulator-specific scope command first; CSF scope is an overlay.
Related commands
/nist-csf-20:assess— run the gap assessment once scope is defined/nist-csf-20:evidence-checklist— enumerate evidence patterns per Function/grc-engineer:gap-assessment general-nist-csf-2-0— direct SCF-crosswalk-driven assessment/grc-engineer:optimize-multi-framework— when CSF is being implemented alongside multiple regulations
Sponsors
Details
- Marketplace
- GRCEngClub/claude-grc-engineering
- Source
- plugins/frameworks/nist-csf-20
- Category
- Community
More from GRCEngClub/claude-grc-engineering
All 70- nydfsv0.1.0
- okta-inspectorv0.1.0
- onepassword-connectorv0.1.0
- oscalv0.1.0
- pbmmv0.1.0
- pci-dssv0.1.0
- poam-automationv0.1.0
- sg-mas-trmv0.1.0
- singapore-pdpav0.1.0
- slack-inspectorv0.1.0
- snowflake-inspectorv0.1.0
- soc2v0.1.0
- splunk-inspectorv0.1.0
- staterampv0.1.0
- teach-mev0.1.0
- tenable-inspectorv0.1.0
- testssl-inspectorv0.1.0
- trust-centerv0.1.0
- us-ccpav0.1.0
- us-exportv0.1.0
- us-finrav0.1.0
- us-hipaa-securityv0.1.0
- us-nerc-cipv0.1.0
- us-soxv0.1.0