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security-compliance-privacy

HIPAA, GDPR, PCI, SOC and other compliance, privacy and secrets management

version
1.0.0
GitHub stars
5

Install

/plugin install security-compliance-privacy@skills-stack

Run it inside Claude Code after adding the marketplace with /plugin marketplace add marslanalvi/SkillsStack.

Contents

Discovered from source

Skills 5

GDPR Data Handling

Practical implementation guide for GDPR-compliant data processing, consent management, and privacy controls.

When to Use This Skill

  • Building systems that process EU personal data
  • Implementing consent management
  • Handling data subject requests (DSRs)
  • Conducting GDPR compliance reviews
  • Designing privacy-first architectures
  • Creating data processing agreements

Core Concepts

1. Personal Data Categories

CategoryExamplesProtection Level
BasicName, email, phoneStandard
Sensitive (Art. 9)Health, religion, ethnicityExplicit consent
Criminal (Art. 10)Convictions, offensesOfficial authority
Children'sUnder 16 dataParental consent

2. Legal Bases for Processing

Article 6 - Lawful Bases:
├── Consent: Freely given, specific, informed
├── Contract: Necessary for contract performance
├── Legal Obligation: Required by law
├── Vital Interests: Protecting someone's life
├── Public Interest: Official functions
└── Legitimate Interest: Balanced against rights

3. Data Subject Rights

Right to Access (Art. 15)      ─┐
Right to Rectification (Art. 16) │
Right to Erasure (Art. 17)       │ Must respond
Right to Restrict (Art. 18)      │ within 1 month
Right to Portability (Art. 20)   │
Right to Object (Art. 21)       ─┘

Detailed worked examples and patterns

Detailed sections (starting with ## Implementation Patterns) live in references/details.md. Read that file when the navigation summary above is insufficient.

Best Practices

Do's

  • Minimize data collection - Only collect what's needed
  • Document everything - Processing activities, legal bases
  • Encrypt PII - At rest and in transit
  • Implement access controls - Need-to-know basis
  • Regular audits - Verify compliance continuously

Don'ts

  • Don't pre-check consent boxes - Must be opt-in
  • Don't bundle consent - Separate purposes separately
  • Don't retain indefinitely - Define and enforce retention
  • Don't ignore DSARs - 30-day response required
  • Don't transfer without safeguards - SCCs or adequacy decisions

Healthcare PHI/PII Compliance Patterns

Patterns for protecting patient data, clinician data, and financial data in healthcare applications. Applicable to HIPAA (US), DISHA (India), GDPR (EU), and general healthcare data protection.

When to Use

  • Building any feature that touches patient records
  • Implementing access control or authentication for clinical systems
  • Designing database schemas for healthcare data
  • Building APIs that return patient or clinician data
  • Implementing audit trails or logging
  • Reviewing code for data exposure vulnerabilities
  • Setting up Row-Level Security (RLS) for multi-tenant healthcare systems

How It Works

Healthcare data protection operates on three layers: classification (what is sensitive), access control (who can see it), and audit (who did see it).

Data Classification

PHI (Protected Health Information) — any data that can identify a patient AND relates to their health: patient name, date of birth, address, phone, email, national ID numbers (SSN, Aadhaar, NHS number), medical record numbers, diagnoses, medications, lab results, imaging, insurance policy and claim details, appointment and admission records, or any combination of the above.

PII (Non-patient-sensitive data) in healthcare systems: clinician/staff personal details, doctor fee structures and payout amounts, employee salary and bank details, vendor payment information.

Access Control: Row-Level Security

ALTER TABLE patients ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

-- Scope access by facility
CREATE POLICY "staff_read_own_facility"
  ON patients FOR SELECT TO authenticated
  USING (facility_id IN (
    SELECT facility_id FROM staff_assignments
    WHERE user_id = auth.uid() AND role IN ('doctor','nurse','lab_tech','admin')
  ));

-- Audit log: insert-only (tamper-proof)
CREATE POLICY "audit_insert_only" ON audit_log FOR INSERT
  TO authenticated WITH CHECK (user_id = auth.uid());
CREATE POLICY "audit_no_modify" ON audit_log FOR UPDATE USING (false);
CREATE POLICY "audit_no_delete" ON audit_log FOR DELETE USING (false);

Audit Trail

Every PHI access or modification must be logged:

interface AuditEntry {
  timestamp: string;
  user_id: string;
  patient_id: string;
  action: 'create' | 'read' | 'update' | 'delete' | 'print' | 'export';
  resource_type: string;
  resource_id: string;
  changes?: { before: object; after: object };
  ip_address: string;
  session_id: string;
}

Common Leak Vectors

Error messages: Never include patient-identifying data in error messages thrown to the client. Log details server-side only.

Console output: Never log full patient objects. Use opaque internal record IDs (UUIDs) — not medical record numbers, national IDs, or names.

URL parameters: Never put patient-identifying data in query strings or path segments that could appear in logs or browser history. Use opaque UUIDs only.

Browser storage: Never store PHI in localStorage or sessionStorage. Keep PHI in memory only, fetch on demand.

Service role keys: Never use the service_role key in client-side code. Always use the anon/publishable key and let RLS enforce access.

Logs and monitoring: Never log full patient records. Use opaque record IDs only (not medical record numbers). Sanitize stack traces before sending to error tracking services.

Database Schema Tagging

Mark PHI/PII columns at the schema level:

COMMENT ON COLUMN patients.name IS 'PHI: patient_name';
COMMENT ON COLUMN patients.dob IS 'PHI: date_of_birth';
COMMENT ON COLUMN patients.aadhaar IS 'PHI: national_id';
COMMENT ON COLUMN doctor_payouts.amount IS 'PII: financial';

Deployment Checklist

Before every deployment:

  • No PHI in error messages or stack traces
  • No PHI in console.log/console.error
  • No PHI in URL parameters
  • No PHI in browser storage
  • No service_role key in client code
  • RLS enabled on all PHI/PII tables
  • Audit trail for all data modifications
  • Session timeout configured
  • API authentication on all PHI endpoints
  • Cross-facility data isolation verified

Examples

Example 1: Safe vs Unsafe Error Handling

// BAD — leaks PHI in error
throw new Error(`Patient ${patient.name} not found in ${patient.facility}`);

// GOOD — generic error, details logged server-side with opaque IDs only
logger.error('Patient lookup failed', { recordId: patient.id, facilityId });
throw new Error('Record not found');

Example 2: RLS Policy for Multi-Facility Isolation

-- Doctor at Facility A cannot see Facility B patients
CREATE POLICY "facility_isolation"
  ON patients FOR SELECT TO authenticated
  USING (facility_id IN (
    SELECT facility_id FROM staff_assignments WHERE user_id = auth.uid()
  ));

-- Test: login as doctor-facility-a, query facility-b patients
-- Expected: 0 rows returned

Example 3: Safe Logging

// BAD — logs identifiable patient data
console.log('Processing patient:', patient);

// GOOD — logs only opaque internal record ID
console.log('Processing record:', patient.id);
// Note: even patient.id should be an opaque UUID, not a medical record number

HIPAA Compliance

Use this as the HIPAA-specific entrypoint when a task is clearly about US healthcare compliance. This skill intentionally stays thin and canonical:

  • healthcare-phi-compliance remains the primary implementation skill for PHI/PII handling, data classification, audit logging, encryption, and leak prevention.
  • healthcare-reviewer remains the specialized reviewer when code, architecture, or product behavior needs a healthcare-aware second pass.
  • security-review still applies for general auth, input-handling, secrets, API, and deployment hardening.

When to Use

  • The request explicitly mentions HIPAA, PHI, covered entities, business associates, or BAAs
  • Building or reviewing US healthcare software that stores, processes, exports, or transmits PHI
  • Assessing whether logging, analytics, LLM prompts, storage, or support workflows create HIPAA exposure
  • Designing patient-facing or clinician-facing systems where minimum necessary access and auditability matter

How It Works

Treat HIPAA as an overlay on top of the broader healthcare privacy skill:

  1. Start with healthcare-phi-compliance for the concrete implementation rules.
  2. Apply HIPAA-specific decision gates:
    • Is this data PHI?
    • Is this actor a covered entity or business associate?
    • Does a vendor or model provider require a BAA before touching the data?
    • Is access limited to the minimum necessary scope?
    • Are read/write/export events auditable?
  3. Escalate to healthcare-reviewer if the task affects patient safety, clinical workflows, or regulated production architecture.

HIPAA-Specific Guardrails

  • Never place PHI in logs, analytics events, crash reports, prompts, or client-visible error strings.
  • Never expose PHI in URLs, browser storage, screenshots, or copied example payloads.
  • Require authenticated access, scoped authorization, and audit trails for PHI reads and writes.
  • Treat third-party SaaS, observability, support tooling, and LLM providers as blocked-by-default until BAA status and data boundaries are clear.
  • Follow minimum necessary access: the right user should only see the smallest PHI slice needed for the task.
  • Prefer opaque internal IDs over names, MRNs, phone numbers, addresses, or other identifiers.

Examples

Example 1: Product request framed as HIPAA

User request:

Add AI-generated visit summaries to our clinician dashboard. We serve US clinics and need to stay HIPAA compliant.

Response pattern:

  • Activate hipaa-compliance
  • Use healthcare-phi-compliance to review PHI movement, logging, storage, and prompt boundaries
  • Verify whether the summarization provider is covered by a BAA before any PHI is sent
  • Escalate to healthcare-reviewer if the summaries influence clinical decisions

Example 2: Vendor/tooling decision

User request:

Can we send support transcripts and patient messages into our analytics stack?

Response pattern:

  • Assume those messages may contain PHI
  • Block the design unless the analytics vendor is approved for HIPAA-bound workloads and the data path is minimized
  • Require redaction or a non-PHI event model when possible

Related Skills

  • healthcare-phi-compliance
  • healthcare-reviewer
  • healthcare-emr-patterns
  • healthcare-eval-harness
  • security-review

PCI Compliance

Master PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) compliance for secure payment processing and handling of cardholder data.

When to Use This Skill

  • Building payment processing systems
  • Handling credit card information
  • Implementing secure payment flows
  • Conducting PCI compliance audits
  • Reducing PCI compliance scope
  • Implementing tokenization and encryption
  • Preparing for PCI DSS assessments

PCI DSS Requirements (12 Core Requirements)

Build and Maintain Secure Network

  1. Install and maintain firewall configuration
  2. Don't use vendor-supplied defaults for passwords

Protect Cardholder Data

  1. Protect stored cardholder data
  2. Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across public networks

Maintain Vulnerability Management

  1. Protect systems against malware
  2. Develop and maintain secure systems and applications

Implement Strong Access Control

  1. Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know
  2. Identify and authenticate access to system components
  3. Restrict physical access to cardholder data

Monitor and Test Networks

  1. Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data
  2. Regularly test security systems and processes

Maintain Information Security Policy

  1. Maintain a policy that addresses information security

Compliance Levels

Level 1: > 6 million transactions/year (annual ROC required) Level 2: 1-6 million transactions/year (annual SAQ) Level 3: 20,000-1 million e-commerce transactions/year Level 4: < 20,000 e-commerce or < 1 million total transactions

Data Minimization (Never Store)

# NEVER STORE THESE
PROHIBITED_DATA = {
    'full_track_data': 'Magnetic stripe data',
    'cvv': 'Card verification code/value',
    'pin': 'PIN or PIN block'
}

# CAN STORE (if encrypted)
ALLOWED_DATA = {
    'pan': 'Primary Account Number (card number)',
    'cardholder_name': 'Name on card',
    'expiration_date': 'Card expiration',
    'service_code': 'Service code'
}

class PaymentData:
    """Safe payment data handling."""

    def __init__(self):
        self.prohibited_fields = ['cvv', 'cvv2', 'cvc', 'pin']

    def sanitize_log(self, data):
        """Remove sensitive data from logs."""
        sanitized = data.copy()

        # Mask PAN
        if 'card_number' in sanitized:
            card = sanitized['card_number']
            sanitized['card_number'] = f"{card[:6]}{'*' * (len(card) - 10)}{card[-4:]}"

        # Remove prohibited data
        for field in self.prohibited_fields:
            sanitized.pop(field, None)

        return sanitized

    def validate_no_prohibited_storage(self, data):
        """Ensure no prohibited data is being stored."""
        for field in self.prohibited_fields:
            if field in data:
                raise SecurityError(f"Attempting to store prohibited field: {field}")

Tokenization

Using Payment Processor Tokens

import stripe

class TokenizedPayment:
    """Handle payments using tokens (no card data on server)."""

    @staticmethod
    def create_payment_method_token(card_details):
        """Create token from card details (client-side only)."""
        # THIS SHOULD ONLY BE DONE CLIENT-SIDE WITH STRIPE.JS
        # NEVER send card details to your server

        """
        // Frontend JavaScript
        const stripe = Stripe('pk_...');

        const {token, error} = await stripe.createToken({
            card: {
                number: '4242424242424242',
                exp_month: 12,
                exp_year: 2024,
                cvc: '123'
            }
        });

        // Send token.id to server (NOT card details)
        """
        pass

    @staticmethod
    def charge_with_token(token_id, amount):
        """Charge using token (server-side)."""
        # Your server only sees the token, never the card number
        stripe.api_key = "sk_..."

        charge = stripe.Charge.create(
            amount=amount,
            currency="usd",
            source=token_id,  # Token instead of card details
            description="Payment"
        )

        return charge

    @staticmethod
    def store_payment_method(customer_id, payment_method_token):
        """Store payment method as token for future use."""
        stripe.Customer.modify(
            customer_id,
            source=payment_method_token
        )

        # Store only customer_id and payment_method_id in your database
        # NEVER store actual card details
        return {
            'customer_id': customer_id,
            'has_payment_method': True
            # DO NOT store: card number, CVV, etc.
        }

Custom Tokenization (Advanced)

import secrets
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet

class TokenVault:
    """Secure token vault for card data (if you must store it)."""

    def __init__(self, encryption_key):
        self.cipher = Fernet(encryption_key)
        self.vault = {}  # In production: use encrypted database

    def tokenize(self, card_data):
        """Convert card data to token."""
        # Generate secure random token
        token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)

        # Encrypt card data
        encrypted = self.cipher.encrypt(json.dumps(card_data).encode())

        # Store token -> encrypted data mapping
        self.vault[token] = encrypted

        return token

    def detokenize(self, token):
        """Retrieve card data from token."""
        encrypted = self.vault.get(token)
        if not encrypted:
            raise ValueError("Token not found")

        # Decrypt
        decrypted = self.cipher.decrypt(encrypted)
        return json.loads(decrypted.decode())

    def delete_token(self, token):
        """Remove token from vault."""
        self.vault.pop(token, None)

Encryption

Data at Rest

from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
import os

class EncryptedStorage:
    """Encrypt data at rest using AES-256-GCM."""

    def __init__(self, encryption_key):
        """Initialize with 256-bit key."""
        self.key = encryption_key  # Must be 32 bytes

    def encrypt(self, plaintext):
        """Encrypt data."""
        # Generate random nonce
        nonce = os.urandom(12)

        # Encrypt
        aesgcm = AESGCM(self.key)
        ciphertext = aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, plaintext.encode(), None)

        # Return nonce + ciphertext
        return nonce + ciphertext

    def decrypt(self, encrypted_data):
        """Decrypt data."""
        # Extract nonce and ciphertext
        nonce = encrypted_data[:12]
        ciphertext = encrypted_data[12:]

        # Decrypt
        aesgcm = AESGCM(self.key)
        plaintext = aesgcm.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext, None)

        return plaintext.decode()

# Usage
storage = EncryptedStorage(os.urandom(32))
encrypted_pan = storage.encrypt("4242424242424242")
# Store encrypted_pan in database

Data in Transit

# Always use TLS 1.2 or higher
# Flask/Django example
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = True  # HTTPS only
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = 'Strict'

# Enforce HTTPS
from flask_talisman import Talisman
Talisman(app, force_https=True)

Additional patterns and templates

More detailed templates and worked examples live in references/details.md. Read that file for the full pattern library.

Secrets Management

Secure secrets management practices for CI/CD pipelines using Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, and other tools.

Purpose

Implement secure secrets management in CI/CD pipelines without hardcoding sensitive information.

When to Use

  • Store API keys and credentials
  • Manage database passwords
  • Handle TLS certificates
  • Rotate secrets automatically
  • Implement least-privilege access

Secrets Management Tools

HashiCorp Vault

  • Centralized secrets management
  • Dynamic secrets generation
  • Secret rotation
  • Audit logging
  • Fine-grained access control

AWS Secrets Manager

  • AWS-native solution
  • Automatic rotation
  • Integration with RDS
  • CloudFormation support

Azure Key Vault

  • Azure-native solution
  • HSM-backed keys
  • Certificate management
  • RBAC integration

Google Secret Manager

  • GCP-native solution
  • Versioning
  • IAM integration

HashiCorp Vault Integration

Setup Vault

# Start Vault dev server
vault server -dev

# Set environment
export VAULT_ADDR='http://127.0.0.1:8200'
export VAULT_TOKEN='root'

# Enable secrets engine
vault secrets enable -path=secret kv-v2

# Store secret
vault kv put secret/database/config username=admin password=secret

GitHub Actions with Vault

name: Deploy with Vault Secrets

on: [push]

jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Import Secrets from Vault
        uses: hashicorp/vault-action@v2
        with:
          url: https://vault.example.com:8200
          token: ${{ secrets.VAULT_TOKEN }}
          secrets: |
            secret/data/database username | DB_USERNAME ;
            secret/data/database password | DB_PASSWORD ;
            secret/data/api key | API_KEY

      - name: Use secrets
        run: |
          echo "Connecting to database as $DB_USERNAME"
          # Use $DB_PASSWORD, $API_KEY

GitLab CI with Vault

deploy:
  image: vault:1.17
  before_script:
    - export VAULT_ADDR=https://vault.example.com:8200
    - export VAULT_TOKEN=$VAULT_TOKEN
    - apk add curl jq
  script:
    - |
      DB_PASSWORD=$(vault kv get -field=password secret/database/config)
      API_KEY=$(vault kv get -field=key secret/api/credentials)
      echo "Deploying with secrets..."
      # Use $DB_PASSWORD, $API_KEY

AWS Secrets Manager

Store Secret

aws secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name production/database/password \
  --secret-string "super-secret-password"

Retrieve in GitHub Actions

- name: Configure AWS credentials
  uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
  with:
    aws-access-key-id: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
    aws-secret-access-key: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
    aws-region: us-west-2

- name: Get secret from AWS
  run: |
    SECRET=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value \
      --secret-id production/database/password \
      --query SecretString \
      --output text)
    echo "::add-mask::$SECRET"
    echo "DB_PASSWORD=$SECRET" >> $GITHUB_ENV

- name: Use secret
  run: |
    # Use $DB_PASSWORD
    ./deploy.sh

Terraform with AWS Secrets Manager

data "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "db_password" {
  secret_id = "production/database/password"
}

resource "aws_db_instance" "main" {
  allocated_storage    = 100
  engine              = "postgres"
  instance_class      = "db.t3.large"
  username            = "admin"
  password            = jsondecode(data.aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.db_password.secret_string)["password"]
}

GitHub Secrets

Organization/Repository Secrets

- name: Use GitHub secret
  env:
    API_KEY: ${{ secrets.API_KEY }}
    DATABASE_URL: ${{ secrets.DATABASE_URL }}
  run: |
    # Secrets are injected as env vars — never print them to logs
    ./deploy.sh

Environment Secrets

deploy:
  runs-on: ubuntu-latest
  environment: production
  steps:
    - name: Deploy
      env:
        PROD_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_API_KEY }}
      run: |
        # Secret injected as env var — never print to logs
        ./deploy.sh

GitLab CI/CD Variables

Project Variables

deploy:
  script:
    # Fail if a variable is missing, but never print its value
    - test -n "$API_KEY" || { echo "API_KEY is not set"; exit 1; }
    - test -n "$DATABASE_URL" || { echo "DATABASE_URL is not set"; exit 1; }

Protected and Masked Variables

  • Protected: Only available in protected branches
  • Masked: Hidden in job logs
  • File type: Stored as file

Best Practices

  1. Never commit secrets to Git
  2. Use different secrets per environment
  3. Rotate secrets regularly
  4. Implement least-privilege access
  5. Enable audit logging
  6. Use secret scanning (GitGuardian, TruffleHog)
  7. Mask secrets in logs
  8. Encrypt secrets at rest
  9. Use short-lived tokens when possible
  10. Document secret requirements

Secret Rotation

Automated Rotation with AWS

import boto3
import json

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    client = boto3.client('secretsmanager')

    # Get current secret
    response = client.get_secret_value(SecretId='my-secret')
    current_secret = json.loads(response['SecretString'])

    # Generate new password
    new_password = generate_strong_password()

    # Update database password
    update_database_password(new_password)

    # Update secret
    client.put_secret_value(
        SecretId='my-secret',
        SecretString=json.dumps({
            'username': current_secret['username'],
            'password': new_password
        })
    )

    return {'statusCode': 200}

Manual Rotation Process

  1. Generate new secret
  2. Update secret in secret store
  3. Update applications to use new secret
  4. Verify functionality
  5. Revoke old secret

External Secrets Operator

Kubernetes Integration

apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: SecretStore
metadata:
  name: vault-backend
  namespace: production
spec:
  provider:
    vault:
      server: "https://vault.example.com:8200"
      path: "secret"
      version: "v2"
      auth:
        kubernetes:
          mountPath: "kubernetes"
          role: "production"

---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
  name: database-credentials
  namespace: production
spec:
  refreshInterval: 1h
  secretStoreRef:
    name: vault-backend
    kind: SecretStore
  target:
    name: database-credentials
    creationPolicy: Owner
  data:
    - secretKey: username
      remoteRef:
        key: database/config
        property: username
    - secretKey: password
      remoteRef:
        key: database/config
        property: password

Secret Scanning

Pre-commit Hook

#!/bin/bash
# .git/hooks/pre-commit

# Check for secrets with TruffleHog
docker run --rm -v "$(pwd):/repo" \
  trufflesecurity/trufflehog:3.88 \
  filesystem --directory=/repo

if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
  echo "❌ Secret detected! Commit blocked."
  exit 1
fi

CI/CD Secret Scanning

secret-scan:
  stage: security
  image: trufflesecurity/trufflehog:3.88
  script:
    - trufflehog filesystem .
  allow_failure: false

Related Skills

  • github-actions-templates - For GitHub Actions integration
  • gitlab-ci-patterns - For GitLab CI integration
  • deployment-pipeline-design - For pipeline architecture

Sponsors

Details

Marketplace
marslanalvi/SkillsStack
Source
plugins/security/compliance-privacy
Category
Security
Keywords
security, compliance-privacy

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