Evite Mcp

evite-mcp

A Model Context Protocol server for Evite — read and act on your events as both guest (invitations received) and host (events you created): list events, view guest lists & RSVP tallies, RSVP, message guests, and create/edit events. Built on @chrischall/mcp-utils.

Status: read + write tools live. The five read tools work against Evite's internal API, authenticating from email/password (tier-1, POST /ajax_login), a raw cookie env var, or a signed-in browser tab (fetchproxy bootstrap). The thirteen write tools ask you to confirm first — nothing is sent until you approve (see Confirmations) — and their endpoints are live-verified (see docs/EVITE-API.md); a couple of request bodies are still assumed rather than captured (#3).

Tools

Six read tools (all read-only), thirteen confirmed write tools, plus evite_healthcheck:

Tool	Endpoint	Returns
evite_list_events	GET /services/events/v1/	your events + a totals breakdown (filterBy = all/host/others, repeatable status, offset/numResults paging)
evite_get_event	GET /services/event/v1/{id}	single-event detail (event, settings, location)
evite_list_guests	GET /services/event/v1/{id}/guests/	the guest list + RSVP responses (delivery status, views, short links)
evite_rsvp_summary	(derived from guests)	just the RSVP summary (yes/no/maybe/noReply + head counts)
evite_list_messages	GET /services/event/v1/{id}/posts/	the event's Messages thread
evite_list_templates	scrapes /invites/{category}/	invitation template slugs (the template_name evite_create_event needs) + display names

Write tools (confirmed)

Every write tool asks you to confirm before it sends anything. A client that can show a confirmation prompt (Claude Code) shows one with the exact values that would be sent (unless MCP_CONFIRM_ELICITATION=off). Elsewhere (claude.ai, Claude Desktop) the first call performs no write (at most a read-only lookup — e.g. evite_update_guest reads the draft guest list to build an exact preview) and returns that preview plus a confirmToken; only a repeat call with the token performs the write. The token is single-use, expires, and is bound to the tool and the exact values — change anything and it is refused (DRAFT_CHANGED) with a fresh preview. See Confirmations. Endpoints are verified; the CSRF token (X-CSRFToken, read fresh per request as it rotates) is attached centrally.

Tool	Endpoint	Action
evite_rsvp	PUT /services/event/v1/{id}/guests/{guestId}	RSVP for a guest (response + adult/kid head counts + optional note)
evite_send_message	POST /tsunami/v1/services/event/{id}/guest/{gid}/messages	send a private message to one guest (body assumed)
evite_broadcast	POST /tsunami/v1/services/event/{id}/broadcast/	broadcast a message to whole RSVP segments (virtual_groups) at once
evite_upload_photo	POST …/photos/v1/{id}/upload/request/ → GCS → finish → shared-gallery	upload a local image to the event's shared photo album (4-step GCS signed upload)
evite_create_event	POST /services/event/v1/ ({event:{…}})	create an event draft (needs template_name; the API 500s even on success)
evite_update_event	PATCH /services/event/v1/{id} ({event:{…}})	edit an event (only the fields you pass change)
evite_add_guest	POST /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/	add guests to the draft (un-sent) list — [{name,email}]
evite_update_guest	PATCH /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/	edit a draft guest's name/email/phone
evite_remove_guest	DELETE /ajax/event/{id}/guestlist/draft/{gid}	remove a draft guest
evite_send	POST /services/event/v1/{id}/send/	"Send now" — emails the ready-to-send guests
evite_cancel_event	POST …/actions/cancel/	cancel an event / delete a draft (destructive; reversible)
evite_reinstate_event	POST …/actions/reinstate/	reinstate a cancelled event
evite_duplicate_event	GET /plus/create/{id}/copy/ (→302)	copy an event into a fresh draft; returns the new event id

The authoring flow is evite_create_event → evite_add_guest → evite_send. evite_send, evite_send_message, evite_broadcast, and evite_cancel_event have real-world effects (emails / cancellation notices), so their confirmation matters.

Confirmations

variable	default
MCP_CONFIRM_MODE	ask-user	What a write does on a client that cannot show a confirmation prompt (claude.ai, Claude Desktop). ask-user: two steps — the first call writes nothing and returns a preview plus a token, and the model must get your approval in chat before calling again with it. auto: the same two steps, but the model may use the token after reviewing the preview itself. refuse: writes are refused on such clients. A client that can show prompts (Claude Code) always gets the real prompt, unless MCP_CONFIRM_ELICITATION=off. An unrecognised value is treated as refuse.
MCP_CONFIRM_ELICITATION	on	off never shows a confirmation prompt, so every client gets the MCP_CONFIRM_MODE behaviour. Set it for a client that says it can show prompts but never does (the write hangs — opencode 2.0.x). Any other value is treated as on, with a warning on stderr.
MCP_CONFIRM_TTL_SECONDS	600	How long a token stays valid.
MCP_CONFIRM_SECRET	random per process	Signing key; set it only if tokens must survive a server restart.

Photo uploads

variable	default
EVITE_UPLOAD_DIR	~/Downloads/evite-mcp	The directories evite_upload_photo may read from — one or more, separated by the platform path delimiter (: on macOS/Linux, ; on Windows); ~ is allowed. A relative path is resolved against the first one. A path outside them (symlinks included), or a hidden file or directory inside them, is refused before the file is even looked at. Put photos to upload in ~/Downloads/evite-mcp, or point this elsewhere.

Architecture

Fetchproxy-archetype MCP. Evite has no public API, so the server calls Evite's internal /services/ web API using your session. src/auth.ts resolves that session in priority order:

1. EVITE_EMAIL + EVITE_PASSWORD (tier-1, preferred) — headless email/password form login: POST the creds to https://www.evite.com/ajax_login, then build the session from the response Set-Cookie jar (x-evite-session, evtsession, csrftoken, x-evite-features). No browser bridge, no hand-copied cookie. Both vars must be set, or the resolver falls through. (Live.)
2. EVITE_SESSION_COOKIE — a raw cookie: header copied from a signed-in evite.com tab (or set in CI). Used verbatim. (Live.)
3. Fetchproxy bootstrap (fallback) — lift the session cookies (x-evite-session, evtsession, x-evite-features, csrftoken) from a signed-in evite.com browser tab via @fetchproxy/bootstrap, which needs the ContextMint Bridge browser extension (Chrome: load the chrome zip from the releases page unpacked. Safari isn't available yet — it will ship inside the ContextMint app, which has no public download — so use Chrome for now). ContextMint Bridge is the fetchproxy browser extension under its new name, from the same maintainer — fetchproxy's own README points to it. Its source is public at nullnet-app/contextmint-bridge: build it yourself, or check a release zip against the .sha256 file published beside it (shasum -a 256 -c contextmint-bridge-chrome-<version>.zip.sha256). Bootstrap runs once; every API call then goes out via plain Node fetch() with the cookies attached. Opt out with EVITE_DISABLE_FETCHPROXY=1. (Live.)

One tier is intentionally deferred (the resolver is shaped to slot it in):

• Fetchproxy as transport (bot-wall retry through the browser bridge) — a fallback only needed if plain fetch trips a wall; not observed during discovery.

The thirteen write tools (rsvp, add/update/remove-guest, send, send-message, broadcast, upload-photo, create/update/cancel/reinstate/duplicate event) ask you to confirm first (a prompt, or a preview + single-use confirmToken; see Confirmations). The single private client.write() helper attaches the CSRF token via one centralized header (CSRF_HEADER = X-CSRFToken; the csrftoken cookie rotates mid-session, so it's read fresh per request). Endpoints span three bases — REST /services/…, the legacy /ajax/event/{id}/… guest list, and the /tsunami/… messaging service — all live-verified; a couple of request bodies remain assumed (#3).

Development

npm install      # resolves @chrischall/mcp-utils from a local tarball (see issue #4)
npm run build
npm test

Docs & roadmap

• Design spec: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-design.md
• Plan 1 (scaffold + spike): docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-scaffold-and-spike.md
• Plan 2 (auth + read tools): docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-auth-and-reads.md
• Internal API reference (verified from a live session): docs/EVITE-API.md

Open work: #3 — write endpoints + CSRF are now live-verified; only a couple of request bodies (send / send-message) remain assumed. #4 tracks publishing the shared lib. (Discovery #1, tier-1 email/password login #2, and the read tools are done.)

License

MIT