Convex security check

A ten minute pass over convex/ that catches the mistakes that ship most often. The one rule: every exported query, mutation, and action is a public endpoint anyone can call with any arguments, so each one must check identity and ownership or be intentionally anonymous.

Run each grep, read what it surfaces, fix or file. This skill finds problems; it does not map the whole system. For that, hand off to convex-security-audit.

When to reach for this

Before merging a pull request that touches convex/
After adding or renaming public functions
The user says "quick security check", "sanity check the backend", or "anything obviously wrong here"
Before a dev to prod push, when there is no time for a full audit

Checklist

Run the commands from the project root. Every grep excludes _generated.

1. Public vs internal

Anything only called by other Convex functions, the scheduler, crons, or webhooks should be internalQuery, internalMutation, or internalAction.

rg -n "export const \w+ = (query|mutation|action)\(" convex --glob '!**/_generated/**'
rg -n "\bapi\.\w+\.\w+" convex --glob '!**/_generated/**'

The second grep finds api.* used inside the backend. Server code scheduling or running a public function is almost always a sign that function should be internal.

Every public function has a client that needs to call it
No api.* inside ctx.scheduler.*, ctx.run*, or crons.*
Admin only operations (role changes, credit grants, deletions across users) are internal

2. Auth

rg -l "= (query|mutation|action)\(" convex --glob '!**/_generated/**' \
  | xargs rg -L "getUserIdentity|getCurrentUser|authedQuery|authedMutation"

Files listed contain public functions and no auth call at all. Open each one. A public post list is fine anonymous. Anything that returns or writes user data is not.

Every public function checks identity or is documented as intentionally anonymous
Auth helpers throw or return early when identity is missing
Roles come from the users table, never from client arguments

3. Validation

rg -nU "(query|mutation|action)\(\{\s*handler" convex --glob '!**/_generated/**'
rg -n "v\.any\(\)" convex --glob '!**/_generated/**'

The first grep finds functions whose definition starts with handler, meaning no args. The second finds v.any(), which turns off validation for that field.

Every function has args and returns validators
No v.any() on arguments that reach the database or an external API
Return validators list fields explicitly so passwordHash, stripeCustomerId, and internal flags cannot leak

4. Ownership and IDs

v.id("tasks") proves the string is a valid ID for that table. It does not prove the caller owns the document.

rg -n "ctx\.db\.(get|patch|delete|replace)\(args\." convex --glob '!**/_generated/**'
rg -n "userId: v\.(id|string)\(" convex --glob '!**/_generated/**'

For each hit in the first grep, find the ownership comparison between the read and the write. For the second, a public function that accepts the caller's own userId as an argument is trusting the client to say who it is.

Every get, patch, delete, replace by a client supplied ID is followed by an ownership or membership check
Caller identity is derived from ctx.auth, never accepted as an argument
Lists use withIndex on the owner field, not a full scan plus filter

5. Secrets

rg -n -i "(sk_live|sk_test|whsec_|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|-----BEGIN|api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*['\"][A-Za-z0-9])" convex src --glob '!**/_generated/**'
rg -n "process\.env\." src

Anything in src/ that reads process.env or import.meta.env ships to the browser. Only deployment URLs and public client IDs belong there.

No secret literals in convex/, src/, tests, or fixtures
Secrets read from process.env inside the action or HTTP action that uses them
Dev and prod deployments use different keys

6. HTTP and storage

rg -n "http\.route|httpAction\(" convex/http.ts
rg -n "storage\.(generateUploadUrl|getUrl)" convex --glob '!**/_generated/**'

Every http.ts route verifies its caller (webhook signature, bearer token, or getUserIdentity) before parsing the body
Routes call internal.*, not api.*
generateUploadUrl requires auth
getUrl is called on a storage ID read from a document the caller owns, never on a storage ID passed by the client

One fix, before and after

The most common finding: auth is checked, ownership is not.

Before:

export const updateTask = mutation({
  args: { taskId: v.id("tasks"), title: v.string() },
  returns: v.null(),
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const identity = await ctx.auth.getUserIdentity();
    if (!identity) throw new ConvexError("Sign in required");
    // any signed in user can rename any task
    await ctx.db.patch(args.taskId, { title: args.title });
    return null;
  },
});

After:

import { mutation } from "./_generated/server";
import { v, ConvexError } from "convex/values";
import { getCurrentUser } from "./lib/auth";

export const updateTask = mutation({
  args: { taskId: v.id("tasks"), title: v.string() },
  returns: v.null(),
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const user = await getCurrentUser(ctx); // throws when signed out
    const task = await ctx.db.get(args.taskId);
    // same error for missing and not owned, so IDs cannot be probed
    if (!task || task.userId !== user._id) {
      throw new ConvexError({ code: "NOT_FOUND", message: "Task not found" });
    }
    await ctx.db.patch(args.taskId, { title: args.title });
    return null;
  },
});

getCurrentUser looks the user up through a by_tokenIdentifier index using identity.tokenIdentifier and throws when there is no identity. Define it once in convex/lib/auth.ts and use it everywhere.

Common mistakes

Mistake	Why it breaks	Do this instead
Checking auth in the React component only	Anyone can call the function from the dashboard or a script	Check in the handler
`v.id("users")` argument for "the current user"	Client can pass any user's ID	Derive from `ctx.auth.getUserIdentity()`
Comparing ownership to `identity.email`	Emails can be reused or unverified	Compare to `user._id`
`internalMutation` treated as safe on its own	The public caller may pass unverified IDs	Check the call site too
Fixing one hit and moving on	The same pattern usually appears in siblings	Fix all hits from the grep

Hand off to convex-security-audit

Stop and run the full audit when any of these are true:

More than two or three findings in steps 2 or 4; the pattern is systemic
The app has multi tenant data (orgs, teams, workspaces)
http.ts has webhook routes or routes that return user data
Files are uploaded and served
The user asks for a report, a launch review, or a post incident review

The audit maps auth per function, data access per table, HTTP exposure, storage, scheduler trust, rate limiting, and produces a written findings report. This check does not.

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